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Abstract
We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion. Over time, a sender per-
forms a series of experiments to persuade a receiver to take a desired action. Due
to constraints on the information flow, the sender must take real time to persuade,
and the receiver may stop listening and take a final action at any time. In ad-
dition, persuasion is costly for both players. To incentivize the receiver to listen,
the sender must leave rents that compensate his listening costs, but neither player
can commit to her/his future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in Markov
perfect equilibrium (MPE) of this game. However, for persuasion costs sufficiently
small, a version of a folk theorem holds: outcomes that approximate Kamenica
and Gentzkow (2011)’s sender-optimal persuasion as well as full revelation (which
is most preferred by the receiver) and everything in between are obtained in MPE,
as the cost vanishes.
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1 Introduction
Persuasion is a quintessential form of communication in which one individual (the sender)
pitches an idea, a product, a political candidate, or a point of view, to another indi-
vidual (the receiver). Whether the receiver ultimately accepts that pitch—or is “per-
suaded”—depends on the underlying truth (the state of world) but also importantly on
the information the sender manages to communicate. In remarkable elegance and general-
ity, Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) show how the sender should communicate information
in such a setting, when she can perform any (Blackwell) experiment instantaneously, with-
out any cost incurred by her or by the receiver. This frictionlessness gives full commitment
power to the sender, as she can publicly choose any experiment and reveal its outcome,
all before the receiver can act.
In practice, however, persuasion is rarely frictionless. Imagine a salesperson pitching
a product to a potential buyer. The buyer has some interest in buying the product but
requires some evidence that it matches his needs. To convince the buyer, the salesperson
might demonstrate certain features of the product or marshal customer testimonies or
sales records, any of which takes real time and effort. Likewise, to process information,
the buyer must pay attention, which is costly.
In this paper, we study the implications of these realistic frictions. Importantly, with
the friction that real information takes time to generate, the sender no longer automat-
ically enjoys full commitment power. Plainly, she cannot promise to the receiver what
experiments she will perform in the future, so her commitment power is reduced to her
current “flow” experiment. Given the lack of commitment by the sender, the receiver
may stop listening and take an action at any time if he does not believe that the sender’s
future experiments are worth waiting for; the buyer in the example above may walk away
at any time when he becomes pessimistic about the product or about the prospect of the
salesperson eventually persuading him. We will examine how well and in what manner
the sender can persuade the receiver in this limited commitment environment. As will
become clear, the key challenge facing the sender is to instill the belief that she will be
worth listening to, namely, to keep the receiver engaged.
We develop a dynamic version of the canonical persuasion model: the state is binary,
L or R, and the receiver can take a binary action, ℓ or r. The receiver prefers to match
the state, by taking action ℓ in state L and r in state R, while the sender prefers the
receiver to choose r regardless of the state. Time is continuous. At each point in time,
the sender may perform some “flow” experiment (unless the game has ended). In response,
the receiver may take an action and end the game, or he could wait, in which case the
game continues. Both the sender’s choice of experiment and its outcome are publicly
observable. Therefore, the two players always keep the same belief about the state.
For information generated by the sender, we consider a rich class of Poisson exper-
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iments. Specifically, we assume that at each instant in time the sender can generate a
collection of Poisson signals that arrive at rates depending on their accuracy. The possible
signals are flexible in their directionalities : a signal can be either good-news (inducing a
higher posterior belief than the current belief), or bad-news (inducing a lower posterior
than the current belief), and the news can be of arbitrary accuracy : the sender can choose
any target posterior, although more accurate news (with targets closer to either 0 or 1)
takes longer to arrive. Our model generalizes the existing Poisson models in the literature
which considered either a good-news or bad-news Poisson experiment of a given accuracy
(see, e.g., Keller, Rady, and Cripps, 2005; Keller and Rady, 2015; Che and Mierendorff,
2019).
Any real experiment, regardless of its accuracy, requires a fixed cost c > 0 per unit
time for the sender to perform and for the receiver to process (or to comprehend). Our
model of information allows for the flexibility and richness of Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011), but adds the friction that information takes time to generate. This serves to
isolate the effect of the friction we introduce.
We study Markov perfect equilibria (MPE) of this game—namely, subgame per-
fect equilibrium strategy profiles prescribing the flow experiment chosen by the sender
and the action (ℓ, r, “wait”) taken by the receiver as a function of the belief p that the
state is R. We are particularly interested in the equilibrium outcomes when the frictions
are sufficiently small (i.e., in the limit as the flow cost c converges to zero). In addition,
we investigate the persuasion dynamics or the “type of pitch” the sender uses to persuade
the receiver in equilibrium of our game.
Is persuasion possible? If so, to what extent? How well the sender can persuade
depends on, among other things, whether the receiver finds her worth listening to, or
more precisely on his belief about the sender providing enough information to justify
his listening costs. That belief depends on the sender’s future experimentation strategy,
which in turn rests on what the receiver will do if the sender betrays her trust and reneges
on her information provision. The multitude of ways in which the players can coordinate
on these choices yield a version of a folk theorem. There is an MPE in which no persuasion
occurs. However, we also obtain a set of MPEs that range from ones that approximate
Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)’s sender-optimal persuasion to ones that approximate full
revelation, and covers everything in between, when the cost c becomes arbitrarily small.
In the “persuasion failure” equilibrium, the receiver is pessimistic about the sender gen-
erating sufficient information, so he simply takes an action immediately without waiting
for information. Up against that pessimism, the sender becomes desperate and maximizes
her chance of once-and-for-all persuasion, which turns out to be the sort of strategy that
the receiver fears the sender would employ, justifying her pessimism.
In a “persuasion” equilibrium, the receiver expects the sender to deliver sufficient
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information that would compensate his listening costs. This optimism in turn motivates
the sender to deliver on her “promise” of informative experimentation; if she reneges on
her experimentation, the ever optimistic receiver would simply wait for resumption of
experimentation an instant later, instead of taking the action that the sender would hope
she takes. In short, the receiver’s optimism begets the sender’s generosity in information
provision, which in turn justifies that optimism. As will be shown, an equilibrium of
this “virtuous cycle” of beliefs can support outcomes that approximate KG’s optimal
persuasion, full-revelation and anything in between, as the flow cost c tends to 0.
Persuasion dynamics. Our model informs us what kind of pitch the sender should
make at each point in time, how long it takes for the sender to persuade, if ever, and
how long the receiver listens to the sender before taking his action. The dynamics of the
persuasion strategy adopted in equilibrium unpacks rich behavioral implications that are
absent in the static persuasion model.
In our MPEs, the sender optimally makes use of the following three strategies: (i)
confidence-building, (ii) confidence-spending, and (iii) confidence-preserving. The confidence-
building strategy involves a bad-news Poisson experiment that induces the receiver’s belief
(that the state is R) to either drift upward or jump to zero. This strategy triggers upward
movement of the belief when the state is R, but quite likely even when it is L; in fact,
it minimizes the probability of bad-news, by insisting that the news be conclusive. In
this sense, the sender can be seen as “R-biasing” or “overselling” the desired action. The
sender finds it optimal to use this strategy when the receiver’s belief is already close to
the target belief that would lead the receiver to choose r.
The confidence-spending strategy involves a good-news Poisson experiment that gen-
erates an upward jump to some target belief, either one inducing the receiver to choose
r, or at least one inducing him to listen to the sender. Such a jump arises rarely, how-
ever, and absent that jump, the receiver’s belief drifts downward. In that sense, this
strategy is a risky one that “spends” the receiver’s confidence over time. This strategy is
used in general when the receiver is already quite pessimistic about R, so that either the
confidence-building strategy would take too long or the receiver would simply not listen.
In particular, it is used as a “last ditch” effort, when the sender is close to giving up on
persuasion or when the receiver is about to choose ℓ.
The confidence-preserving strategy combines the above two strategies—namely, a
good-news Poisson experiment inducing the belief to jump to a persuasion target, and a
bad-news Poisson experiment inducing the belief to jump to zero. This strategy is effective
if the receiver is sufficiently skeptical relative to the persuasion target (i.e., the belief that
will trigger him to choose r) so that the confidence-building strategy will take too long.
Confidence spending could accomplish persuasion fast and thus can be used for a range
of beliefs, but the sender would be running down the receiver’s confidence in the process.
4
Hence, at some point the sender finds it optimal to switch to the confidence-preserving
strategy, which prevents the receiver’s belief from deteriorating further. Technically, the
belief where the sender switches to this strategy constitutes an absorbing point of the be-
lief dynamics; from then on, the belief does not move, unless either a sudden persuasion
breakthrough or persuasion breakdown occurs.
The equilibrium strategy of the sender combines these three strategies in different
ways under different economic conditions, thereby exhibiting rich and novel persuasion
dynamics. Our equilibrium characterization in Section 5 describes precisely how the
sender does this.
Related literature. This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, it con-
tributes to the Bayesian persuasion literature that began with Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011) and Aumann and Maschler (1995), by studying the problem in a dynamic envi-
ronment. Several recent papers also consider dynamic models (e.g., Brocas and Carrillo,
2007; Kremer, Mansour, and Perry, 2014; Au, 2015; Ely, 2017; Renault, Solan, and Vieille,
2017; Bizzotto, Rudiger, and Vigier, 2018; Che and Ho¨rner, 2018; Henry and Ottaviani,
2019; Ely and Szydlowski, 2020; Orlov, Skrzypacz, and Zryumov, forthcoming). In most of
these papers, there are no restrictions on the set of feasible experiments, and full commit-
ment is assumed outright. When there are restrictions on the set of feasible experiments
(e.g., Brocas and Carrillo, 2007; Henry and Ottaviani, 2019), the receiver cannot choose
to stop listening. Hence, our central issues—namely, a lack of commitment by the sender
to persuade and by the receiver to listen—do not arise in those papers.1
Second, the receiver’s problem in our paper involves a stopping problem, which has
been studied extensively in the single agent context, beginning with Wald (1947) and
Arrow, Blackwell, and Girshick (1949). In particular, Nikandrova and Pancs (2018), Che
and Mierendorff (2019) and Mayskaya (2016) study an agent’s stopping problem when
she acquires information through Poisson experiments.2 Che and Mierendorff (2019)
introduced the general class of Poisson experiments adopted in this paper. However, the
generality is irrelevant in their model, because the decision-maker optimally chooses only
between two conclusive experiments (i.e., never chooses a non-conclusive experiment).
Finally, the current paper is closely related to repeated/dynamic communication mod-
els. Margaria and Smolin (2018), Best and Quigley (2017), and Mathevet, Pearce, and
1Henry and Ottaviani (2019) consider a version of non-commitment problem but one in which the
receiver has a stronger commitment power than in our model: the receiver in their model (e.g., a drug
approver) can effectively force the sender (e.g., a drug company) to experiment by not approving the
sender’s application (e.g., for a new drug). The sender’s desire for the receiver to “wait” arises in Orlov,
Skrzypacz, and Zryumov (forthcoming), but “waiting” is a payoff-relevant action in their context of
exercising a real option; that is, it is desired in its own merit and not as a means for persuasion as in the
current paper.
2The Wald stopping problem has also been studied with drift-diffusion learning (e.g., Moscarini and
Smith, 2001; Ke and Villas-Boas, 2016; Fudenberg, Strack, and Strzalecki, 2017), and in a model that
allows for general endogenous experimentation (see Zhong, 2019).
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Stachetti (2019) study repeated cheap-talk communication, and some of them establish
versions of folk theorems. Their models consider repeated actions by receiver(s), serially
independent states and feedbacks on the veracity of the sender’s communication, based
on which non-Markovian punishment can be levied to support a cooperative outcome. By
contrast, the current model considers a fixed state, once-and-for-all action by the receiver
(and hence no feedback), and Markov perfect equilibria.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 illustrates the main ideas of our equilibria. Section 4 states our folk theorem.
Section 5 explores the dynamics of our MPE strategies and their implications. Section 6
concludes.
2 Model
We consider a game in which a Sender (“she”) wishes to persuade a Receiver (“he”).
There is an unknown state ω which can be either L (“left”) or R (“right”). The receiver
ultimately takes a binary action ℓ or r, which yields the following payoffs for the sender
and the receiver:
Payoffs for the sender and the receiver
state/actions ℓ r
L (0, uLℓ ) (v, u
L
r )
R (0, uRℓ ) (v, u
R
r )
The receiver gets uωa if he takes action a ∈ {ℓ, r} when the state is ω ∈ {L,R}. The
sender’s payoff depends only on the receiver’s action: she gets v > 0 if the receiver takes
r and zero otherwise. We assume uLℓ > max{u
L
r , 0} and u
R
r > max{u
R
ℓ , 0}, so that the
receiver prefers to match the action with the state, and also v > 0, so that the sender
prefers action r to action ℓ. Notice that this payoff structure corresponds to the leading
examples considered by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) (KG, hereafter) and Bergemann
and Morris (2019), where a prosecutor seeks to persuade a judge to convict a defendant,
or a regulator seeks to dissuade a depositor from running on a bank. Both players begin
with a common prior p0 that the state is R, and use Bayes rule to update their beliefs.
KG Benchmark. By now, it is well understood how the sender may optimally persuade
the receiver if she can commit to an experiment without any restrictions. For each a ∈
{ℓ, r}, let Ua(p) denote the receiver’s expected payoff when he takes action a with belief
p. In addition, let pˆ denote the belief at which the receiver is indifferent between actions
ℓ and r, that is, Uℓ(pˆ) = Ur(pˆ).
3
3Specifically, for each p ∈ [0, 1], Uℓ(p) := pu
R
ℓ + (1 − p)u
L
ℓ and Ur(p) := pu
R
r + (1 − p)u
L
r . Therefore,
pˆ =
(
uLℓ − u
L
r
)
/
(
uRr − u
R
ℓ + u
L
ℓ − u
L
r
)
, which is well-defined in (0, 1) under our assumptions on the
receiver’s payoffs.
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uLr
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uRr
Figure 1: Payoffs from static persuasion. Solid red curves: payoffs without persuasion
(information). Dashed blue curve: the sender’s expected payoff in the KG solution. Blue
dots: payoffs in the KG solution at prior p0. Dash-dotted green curves: payoffs under a
fully revealing experiment.
If the sender provides no information, then the receiver takes action r if and only
if p0 ≥ pˆ. Therefore, persuasion is necessary only when p0 < pˆ. In this case, the KG
solution prescribes an experiment that induces only two posterior beliefs, q− = 0 and
q+ = pˆ. The former leads to action ℓ, while the latter results in action r. This experiment
is optimal for the sender, because pˆ is the minimum belief necessary to trigger action r,
and setting q− = 0 maximizes the probability of generating pˆ, and thus action r. The
resulting payoff for the sender is p0v/pˆ, as given by the dashed blue line in the left panel
of Figure 1. The flip side is that the receiver enjoys no rents from persuasion; his payoff
is U(p) := max{Uℓ(p), Ur(p)}, the same as if no information were provided, as depicted in
the right panel of Figure 1.
Dynamic model. We consider a dynamic version of the above Bayesian persuasion
problem. Time flows continuously starting from 0. Unless the game has ended, at each
point in time t ≥ 0, either the sender performs an informative experiment from a feasible
set at the flow cost of c > 0, or she simply “passes,” in which case she incurs no cost.
Both the feasible experiments and the nature of flow costs will be made precise below. If
the sender experiments, then the receiver also pays the same flow cost c and observes the
experiment and its outcome. If the sender passes, then the receiver incurs no flow cost
and obtains no information.4 Then, the receiver decides whether to take an irreversible
action a ∈ {ℓ, r} or to “wait.” The former ends the game, while the latter lets the game
continue to the next instant.
There are two notable modeling assumptions. First, the receiver can take a game-
4In this sense, flow cost c is interpreted as a “listening cost” rather than a waiting cost. This distinction
does not matter in the continuous time game; our analysis below will not change even if the receiver incurs
cost c, regardless of whether the sender passes or not. However, it is relevant in the discrete-time version
of our model.
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ending action at any point in time, that is, he is not restricted to listen to the sender.
This is the fundamental difference from KG, in which the receiver is allowed to take an
action only after the sender finishes her information provision. Second, the players’ flow
(information) costs are assumed to be the same. This, however, is just a normalization,
which allows us to directly compare the players’ payoffs, and all subsequent results can
be reinterpreted as relative to each player’s individual information cost.5
Feasible experiments. We endow the sender with a class of Poisson experiments.
Specifically, at each point in time, the sender may expend one unit of a resource (attention)
across different experiments that generate Poisson signals. The experiments are indexed
by i ∈ N.6 Each Poisson experiment i ∈ N generates breakthrough news that moves the
belief to a target posterior qi ∈ [0, 1] of the sender’s choosing. The sender also chooses
the share αi ∈ [0, 1] of her resources allocated to experiment i, subject to the (budget)
constraint that
∑∞
i=1 αi ≤ 1. We call a collection of experiments (αi, qi)i∈N an information
structure.
Given an information structure (αi, qi)i∈N, a Poisson jump to posterior to qi 6= p occurs
at the arrival rate of7
αiλ
p(1− qi)
|qi − p|
if ω = L, and αiλ
qi(1− p)
|qi − p|
if ω = R.
The unconditional arrival rate is then given by
(1− p) · αiλ
p(1− qi)
|qi − p|
+ p · αiλ
qi(1− p)
|qi − p|
= αiλ
p(1− p)
|qi − p|
. (1)
These arrival rates are micro-founded via a class of binary experiments in a discrete
time model, as we show in Section 6.1. Further, they provide a natural generalization of
the Poisson models considered in the existing literature.8 To see this, suppose that the
5Suppose that the sender’s cost is given by cs, while that of the receiver is cr. Such a model is
equivalent to our normalized one in which c′r = c
′
s = cr and v
′ = v(cr/cs). When solving the model for a
fixed set of parameters (uωa , v, c, λ), this normalization does not affect the results. If we let c tend to 0,
we are implicitly assuming that the sender’s and receiver’s (unnormalized) costs, cs and cr, converge to
zero at the same rate.
6One can extend this to an uncountable set of experiments. However, in our model, the sender never
mixes over an infinite number of experiments, and thus such extra generality is unnecessary.
7For qi = p the experiment is uninformative and we set the arrival rate to zero in both states. This
has the same effect on information as setting αi = 0.
8The class of feasible information structures is formulated in terms of the current belief p and jump-
target beliefs qi. We emphasize, however, that there is an underlying class of information structures
that is independent of beliefs. Hence, which experiments are feasible does not depend on the current
belief of the players. Section 6.1 makes this clear in a discrete time foundation, and Appendix A.2 states
the class of feasible information structures in continuous time without reference to beliefs. This feature
distinguishes our approach from the rational inattention model (Sims, 2003; Matejka and McKay, 2015),
in which costs or constraints are based on a measure of information that quantifies the uncertainty in the
posterior beliefs induced by an information structure (see also Frankel and Kamenica, forthcoming).
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sender allocates the entire unit resource to one Poisson experiment with q. The jump to
posterior q then occurs at the rate of λp(1 − p)/|q − p|. Conclusive R-evidence (q = 1)
is obtained at the rate of λp, as is assumed in “good” news models (see, e.g., Keller,
Rady, and Cripps, 2005). Likewise, conclusive L-evidence (q = 0) is obtained at the
rate of λ(1 − p), as is assumed in “bad” news models (see, e.g., Keller and Rady, 2015).
Our model allows for such conclusive news, but it also allows for arbitrary non-conclusive
news with q ∈ (0, 1), as well as any arbitrary mixture among them. Further, our arrival
rate assumption captures the intuitive idea that more accurate information takes longer to
generate. For example, assuming q > p, the arrival rate increases as the news becomes less
precise (q decreases), and it approaches infinity as the news becomes totally uninformative
(i.e., in the limit as q tends to p). Lastly, limited arrival rates, together with the budget
constraint
∑
i αi ≤ 1, capture the important feature of our model that any meaningful
persuasion takes time and requires delay.
For our purpose, it suffices to consider either informative information structures where
the constraint is binding
∑
i αi = 1, or “passing” which corresponds to αi = 0 for all i ∈ N.
If the sender uses an informative information structure, both players incur a flow cost of
c. If the sender passes, neither player incurs any flow cost.9
If no Poisson jump arrives when the sender uses the information structure (αi, qi)i∈N,
the belief drifts according to the following law of motion:10
p˙ = −
(∑
i:qi>p
αi −
∑
i:qi<p
αi
)
λp(1− p). (2)
Note that the drift rate depends only on the difference between the fractions of resources
allocated to “right” versus “left” Poisson signals. In particular, the rate does not depend
on the precision qi of the news in the individual experiments. The reason is that the
precision of news and its arrival rate offset each other, leaving the drift rate unaffected.
This feature makes the analysis tractable while at the same time generalizing conclusive
Poisson models in an intuitive way.
Among many feasible experiments, the following three, visualized in Figure 2, will
9A more general formulation would allow for “partial passing” by assuming that each player incurs
flow cost c per unit experiment that is informative. Specifically, given (αi, qi)i∈N, each player incurs the
flow cost of (
∑
i:qi 6=p
αi)c. In other words, positive costs are incurred only when a nontrivial experiment
is performed and are proportional to the total share of such experiments. We do not explicitly model
partial passing since it is never optimal for the sender.
10Since the belief is a martingale, we have
∞∑
i=1
qiαiλ
pt(1− pt)
|qi − pt|
dt+
(
1−
∞∑
i=1
αiλ
pt(1− pt)
|qi − pt|
dt
)
(pt + p˙tdt) = pt
⇐⇒
(
1−
∞∑
i=1
αiλ
pt(1− pt)
|qi − pt|
dt
)
p˙t =
(
∞∑
i=1
pt − qi
|qi − pt|
αi
)
λpt(1− pt).
Letting dt→ 0, we obtain the updating formula.
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R-drifting, targeting 0:
0 1pt
L-drifting, targeting q:
0 1pt q
Stationary, targeting 0 or q:
0 1pt q
Figure 2: Three prominent feasible experiments.
prove particularly relevant for our purpose and will be frequently referred to. They
formalize the three modes of persuasion discussed in the introduction:
• R-drifting experiment (confidence building): α1 = 1 with q1 = 0. The sender
devotes all resources to a Poisson experiment with the (posterior) jump target q1 = 0.
In the absence of a jump, the posterior drifts to the right, at rate p˙ = λp(1− p).
• L-drifting experiment (confidence spending): α1 = 1 with q1 = q for some q > p.
The sender devotes all resources to a Poisson experiment with jumps targeting
some posterior q > p. The precise jump target q will be specified in our equilibrium
construction. In the absence of a jump, the posterior drifts to the left, at rate
p˙ = −λp(1− p).
• Stationary experiment (confidence preserving): α1 = α2 = 1/2 with q1 = 0
and q2 = q for some q > p. The sender assigns equal resources to an experiment
targeting q1 = 0 and one targeting q2 = q. Absent jumps, the posterior remains
unchanged.
Solution concept. We study (pure-strategy) Markov Perfect equilibria (MPE, here-
after) of this dynamic game in which both players’ strategies depend only on the current
belief p. Formally, a profile of Markov strategies specifies for each belief p ∈ [0, 1], an in-
formation structure (αi, qi)i∈N chosen by the sender, and an action a ∈ {ℓ, r,wait} chosen
by the receiver. An MPE is a strategy profile that, starting from any belief p ∈ [0, 1],
forms a subgame perfect equilibrium.11 Naturally, this solution concept limits the use
of (punishment) strategies depending solely on the payoff-irrelevant part of the histories,
and serves to discipline the strategies off the equilibrium path.
We impose a restriction that captures the spirit of “perfection” in our continuous time
framework. Suppose that at some p, the receiver would choose action ℓ immediately,
unless a Poisson signal causes a discrete jump in beliefs. In continuous time, the latter
event occurs with probability 0, and therefore, the sender’s strategy at p is inconsequential
11There are well known technical issues in defining a game in continuous time (see Simon and Stinch-
combe, 1989; Bergin and MacLeod, 1993). In Appendix A.1, we formally define admissible strategy
profiles that guarantee a well defined outcome of the game and define Markov perfect equilibria.
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uLℓ
uLr
uRℓ
uRr
0 p0 pˆ 1
Uℓ(p0)
UdKG(p0)
Figure 3: Replicating the KG outcome through R-drifting experiments.
for the players’ payoffs. We require the sender to choose a strategy that maximizes her
flow payoff in such a situation. This can be seen as selecting an MPE that is robust to a
discrete-time approximation: in discrete time, a Poisson jump would occur with a positive
probability, and thus the sender’s strategy would have non-trivial payoff consequences.
See Appendix A.1 for a formal definition.
3 Illustration: Persuading the Receiver to Listen
We begin by illustrating the key issue facing the sender: persuading the receiver to listen.
To this end, consider any prior p0 < pˆ, so that persuasion is not trivial, and suppose that
the sender repeatedly chooses R-drifting experiments with jumps targeting q = 0 until
the posterior either jumps to 0 or drifts to pˆ, as depicted on the horizontal axis in Figure
3. This strategy exactly replicates the KG solution (in the sense that it yields the same
probabilities of reaching the two posteriors, 0 and pˆ, as the KG solution), provided that
the receiver listens to the sender for a sufficiently long time.
But will the receiver wait until a target belief of pˆ or 0 is reached? The answer is no.
The KG experiment leaves no rents for the receiver even without listening costs, and thus
listening will make the receiver strictly worse off compared with choosing ℓ immediately:
in Figure 3, the receiver’s expected gross payoff from the static KG experiment is Uℓ(p0).
Due to listening costs, the receiver’s expected payoff under the dynamic KG strategy,
denoted here by UdKG(p0), is strictly smaller than Uℓ(p0). In other words, the dynamic
strategy implementing the KG solution cannot persuade the receiver to wait and listen,
so it does not permit any persuasion.12 Indeed, this problem leads to the existence of a
12The KG outcome can also be replicated by other dynamic strategies. For instance, the sender could
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no-persuasion MPE, regardless of the listening cost c > 0.
Theorem 1 (Persuasion Failure). For any c > 0, there exists an MPE in which no
persuasion occurs, that is, for any p0, the receiver immediately takes either action ℓ or r.
Proof. Consider the following strategy profile: the receiver chooses ℓ for p < pˆ and r
for p ≥ pˆ; and the sender chooses the L-drifting experiment with jump target pˆ for all
p ∈ (πˆℓL, pˆ) and passes for all p /∈ (πˆℓL, pˆ), where the cutoff πˆℓL is the belief at which the
sender is indifferent between the L-drifting experiment and stopping (so that the receiver
chooses ℓ).13
In order to show that this strategy profile is indeed an equilibrium, first consider the
receiver’s incentives given the sender’s strategy. If p 6∈ (πˆℓL, pˆ), then the sender never
provides information, so the receiver has no incentive to wait, and will take an action
immediately. If p ∈ (πˆℓL, pˆ), then the sender never moves the belief into the region where
the receiver strictly prefers to take action r (i.e., strictly above pˆ). This implies that
the receiver’s expected payoff is equal to Uℓ(p0) minus any listening cost she may incur.
Therefore, again, it is optimal for the receiver to take an action immediately.
Now consider the sender’s incentives given the receiver’s strategy. If p ≥ pˆ, then
it is trivially optimal for the sender to pass. Now suppose that p < pˆ. Our refinement,
discussed at the end of Section 2, requires that the sender choose an information structure
that maximizes her flow payoff, which is given by14
max
(αi,qi)i∈N
∑
qi 6=p
αiλ
p(1− p)
|qi − p|
1{qi≥pˆ}v − c subject to
∑
αi
αi = 1.
If the sender chooses any nontrivial experiment, its jump target must be qi = pˆ. Hence
the optimal information structure is either (α1 = 1, q1 = pˆ) or αi = 0 for all i. The former
is optimal if and only if λp(1−p)
pˆ−p
v ≥ c, or equivalently p ≥ πˆℓL.
The no-persuasion equilibrium constructed in the proof showcases a total collapse of
trust between the two players. The receiver does not trust the sender to convey valu-
able information (e.g., an experiment targeting q > pˆ), so she refuses to listen to her.
This attitude makes the sender desperate for a quick breakthrough; she tries to achieve
repeatedly choose a stationary strategy with jumps targeting q1 = pˆ and q2 = 0 until either jump occurs.
However, this (and in fact, any other) strategy would not incentivize the receiver to listen, for the same
reason as in the case of repeating R-drifting experiments.
13Specifically, πˆℓL satisfies
c =
λπˆℓL(1 − πˆℓL)
pˆ− πˆℓL
v ⇐⇒ πˆℓL =
1
2
+
c
2λv
−
√(
1
2
+
c
2λv
)2
−
cpˆ
λv
.
14The equation follows from the fact that under the given strategy profile, the sender’s value function
is V (p) = v if p ≥ pˆ and V (p) = 0 otherwise; and when the target posterior is qi, a Poisson jump occurs
at rate λp(1− p)/|qi − p|.
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persuasion targeting just pˆ, which is indeed not enough for the receiver to be willing to
wait.
Can trust be restored? In other words, can the sender ever persuade the receiver to
listen to her? She certainly can, if she can commit to a dynamic strategy, that is, if
she can credibly promise to provide more information in the future. Consider the follow-
ing modification of the dynamic KG experiment discussed above: the sender repeatedly
chooses R-drifting experiments with jumps targeting zero, until either the jump occurs or
the belief reaches p∗ > pˆ. If the receiver waits until p either jumps to 0 (in which case she
takes action ℓ) or reaches p∗ (in which case she takes action r), then her expected payoff
is equal to15
UR(p0) =
p∗ − p0
p∗
uLℓ +
p0
p∗
Ur(p
∗)−
(
p0 log
(
p∗
1− p∗
1− p0
p0
)
+ 1−
p0
p∗
)
c
λ
.
Importantly, if p∗ is sufficiently larger than pˆ (and c is sufficiently small), then UR(p) (the
dotted curve in Figure 4) stays above max{Uℓ(p), Ur(p)} (the black kinked curve) while
p drifts toward p∗, so the receiver prefers to wait. Intuitively, unlike in the KG solution,
this “more generous” persuasion scheme promises the receiver enough rents that make it
worth listening to.
If c is sufficiently small, the required belief target p∗ need not exceed pˆ by much. In
fact, p∗ can be chosen to converge to pˆ as c → 0. In this fashion, a dynamic persuasion
strategy can be constructed to virtually implement the KG solution when c is sufficiently
small.
At first glance, this strategy seems unlikely to work without the sender’s commitment
power. How can she credibly continue her experiment even after the posterior has risen
past pˆ? Why not simply stop at the posterior pˆ—the belief that should have convinced the
receiver to choose r? Surprisingly, however, the strategy works even without commit-
ment. The reason lies with the fact that the equilibrium beliefs generated by the Markov
strategies themselves can provide a sufficient incentive for the sender to go above pˆ. We
already argued that, with a suitably chosen p∗ > pˆ, the receiver is incentivized to wait past
pˆ, due to the “optimistic” equilibrium belief that the sender will continue to experiment
15To understand this explicit solution, first notice that under the prescribed strategy profile, the receiver
takes action ℓ when p jumps to 0, which occurs with probability (p∗−p0)/p
∗, and action r when p reaches
to p∗, which occurs with probability p0/p
∗. The last term captures the total expected listening cost. The
length of time τ it takes for p to reach p∗ absent jumps is derived as follows:
p∗ =
p0
p0 + (1− p0)e−λτ
⇔ τ =
1
λ
log
(
p∗
1− p∗
1− p0
p0
)
.
Hence, the total listening cost is equal to
(1− p0)
∫ τ
0
ctd
(
1− e−λt
)
+
(
p0 + (1− p0)e
−λτ
)
cτ =
(
p0 log
(
p∗
1− p∗
1− p0
p0
)
+ 1−
p0
p∗
)
c
λ
.
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Figure 4: Persuasive R-drifting experiments
until a much higher belief p∗ is reached. Crucially, this optimism in turn incentivizes the
sender to carry out her strategy:16 were she to deviate and, say, “pass” at q = pˆ, the
receiver would simply wait (instead of choosing r), believing that the sender will shortly
resume her R-drifting experiments after the “unexpected” pass.17 Given this response,
the sender cannot gain from deviating: she cannot convince the receiver to “prematurely”
choose r. To sum up, the sender’s strategy instills optimism in the receiver to wait and
listen to the sender, and this optimism, or the power of beliefs, in turn incentivizes the
sender to carry out the strategy.
4 Folk Theorem
The equilibrium logic outlined in the previous section applies not just to strategy profiles
that approximate the KG solution, but also to other strategy profiles with a target belief
p∗ ∈ (pˆ, 1). Building upon this observation, we establish a version of a folk theorem: any
payoff for the sender between the KG solution and her payoff from full revelation can be
16We will show in Section 5.2 that under certain conditions, using R-drifting experiments is not just
better than passing but also the optimal experiment (best response), given that the receiver waits. Here,
we illustrate the possibility of persuasion for this case. The logic extends to other cases where the sender
optimally uses different experiments to persuade the receiver.
17To be formal, suppose that the current belief is slightly below p∗ (say, p = p∗ − λdt), and the sender
deviates and passes. Given the belief that she will continue her R-drifting strategy in the next instant,
the receiver prefers waiting to taking action r immediately if and only if
c ≤ λ(1 − p∗)(uLℓ − Ur(p
∗)) + λp∗(1 − p∗)U ′r(p
∗)⇔ p∗ ≤ p :=
(
uLℓ − u
L
r
)
λ− c(
uLℓ − u
L
r
)
λ
.
In other words, even if p is close to p∗ (and strictly above pˆ), the receiver is willing to wait as long as p∗
is not too high. Importantly, p approaches 1 as c tends to 0.
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Figure 5: Implementable payoff set for each player at each p0.
virtually supported as an MPE payoff.
Theorem 2 (Folk theorem). Fix any prior p0 ∈ (0, 1). For any sender payoff V ∈
(p0v,min{p0/pˆ, 1}v), if c is sufficiently small, there exists an MPE in which the sender
obtains V ; likewise, for any receiver payoff U ∈
(
U(p0), p0u
R
r + (1− p0)u
L
ℓ
)
, if c is suffi-
ciently small, there exists an MPE in which the receiver achieves U .
Figure 5 depicts how the set of implementable payoffs for each player varies according
to p0 in the limit as c tends to 0. Theorem 2 shows that any payoffs in the green and
red shaded areas can be implemented in an MPE, provided that c is sufficiently small. In
the left panel, the upper bound for the sender’s payoff is given by the KG-optimal payoff
min{p0/pˆ, 1}v, and the lower bound of the green shaded area is given by the sender’s
payoff from full revelation p0v. For the receiver, by contrast, full revelation defines the
upper bound p0u
R
r + (1 − p0)u
L
ℓ , whereas the KG-payoff, which leaves no rent for the
receiver, is given by U(p0). In both panels, the thick blue lines correspond to the players’
payoffs in the no-persuasion equilibria of Theorem 1.
Note that Theorem 2 is silent about payoffs in the gray shaded region. In the static
KG environment, these payoffs can be achieved by the (sender-pessimal) experiment that
splits the prior p into two posteriors, 1 and q ∈ (0, pˆ). The following theorem shows that
the sender’s payoffs in this region cannot be supported as an MPE payoff, for a sufficiently
small c > 0.
Theorem 3. If p0 < pˆ, then the sender’s MPE payoff is either equal to 0 or at least
p0v − 2c/λ. If p0 ≥ pˆ, then the sender’s MPE payoff cannot be smaller than p0v − 2c/λ.
Proof. Fix p0 < pˆ, and consider any MPE. If the receiver’s strategy is to wait at p0, then
the sender can always adopt the stationary strategy with jump-targets 0 and 1, which
will guarantee her the payoff of p0v − 2c/λ.
18 If the receiver’s strategy is to stop at p0,
18In order to understand this payoff, notice that the strategy fully reveals the state, and thus the
sender gets v only in state R. In addition, in each state, a Poisson jump occurs at rate λ/2, and thus the
expected waiting time equals 2/λ, which is multiplied by c to obtain the expected cost.
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then the receiver takes action ℓ immediately, in which case the sender’s payoff is equal to
0. Therefore, the sender’s expected payoff is either equal to 0 or above p0v − 2c/λ.
Now suppose p0 ≥ pˆ, and consider any MPE. As above, if p0 belongs to the waiting
region, then the sender’s payoff must exceed at least p0v − 2c/λ. If p belongs to the
stopping region, then the sender’s payoff is equal to v.19 In either case, the sender’s
payoff is at least as much as p0v − 2c/λ.
We prove the folk theorem by constructing MPEs with a particularly simple structure:
Definition 1. A Markov perfect equilibrium is a simple MPE (henceforth, SMPE) if
there exist p∗ ∈ (0, pˆ) and p
∗ ∈ (pˆ, 1) such that the receiver chooses action ℓ if p < p∗,
waits if p ∈ (p∗, p
∗), and chooses action r if p ≥ p∗.20
In other words, in an SMPE, the receiver waits for more information if p ∈ W and
takes an action, ℓ or r, otherwise, where W = (p∗, p
∗) or W = [p∗, p
∗) denotes the waiting
region:
|
p=0
ℓ︷ ︸︸ ︷
———————— p∗
“wait”︷ ︸︸ ︷
———————— p∗
r︷ ︸︸ ︷
—————— |
1
While this is the most natural equilibrium structure, we do not exclude the possibility of
MPEs that violate this structure. Our folk theorem, as well as Theorem 3, is independent
of whether such non-simple equilibria exist or not.
To prove the folk theorem, we begin by fixing p∗ ∈ (pˆ, 1). Then, for each c sufficiently
small, we identify a unique value of p∗ that yields an SMPE. We then show that as c
tends to 0, p∗ approaches 0 as well. This implies that given p
∗, the limit SMPE spans
the sender’s payoffs on the line that connects (0, 0) and (p∗, v) (the dashed line in the
left panel of Figure 5) and the receiver’s payoffs on the line that connects (0, uLℓ ) and
(p∗, Ur(p
∗)) (the dashed line in the right panel). By varying p∗ from pˆ to 1, we can cover
the entire shaded areas in Figure 5. Note that with this construction, we also obtain a
characterization of feasible payoff vectors (V, U) for the sender and receiver that can arise
in an SMPE in the limit as c tends to 0. We state this in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. For any prior p0 ∈ [0, 1], in the limit as c tends to 0, the set of SMPE
payoff vectors (V, U) is given by{
(V, U)
∣∣∣∣∃p∗ ∈ [max {p0, pˆ} , 1] : V = p0p∗ v, U = p0p∗Ur(p∗) + p
∗ − p0
p∗
uLℓ
}
,
19At pˆ, the receiver is indifferent between ℓ and r. In any MPE, however, she must take action r if
pˆ is not in the waiting region. This is necessary for the existence of a best response of the sender. For
example, in the no-persuasion equilibrium, if the receiver takes action ℓ at pˆ, then the sender has no
optimal jump-target for p < pˆ.
20We do not restrict the receiver’s decision at the lower bound p∗, so that the waiting region can be
either W = (p∗, p
∗) or W = [p∗, p
∗). Requiring W = (p∗, p
∗) can lead to non-existence of an SMPE
(see Proposition 2 below, as well as the discussion in Footnote 19). Requiring W = [p∗, p
∗) can lead
to non-admissibility of the sender’s best response in Proposition 3 (see the discussion of admissibility in
Appendix A.1).
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with the addition of the no-persuasion payoff vector (0, U(p0)) for p0 < pˆ.
5 Persuasion Dynamics
While the folk theorem in Section 4 is of clear interest, it is equally interesting to tease
out the behavioral implications from our dynamic persuasion model. In this section, we
provide a full description of SMPE strategy profiles and illustrate the resulting equilibrium
persuasion dynamics. We first explain why the sender optimally uses the three modes of
persuasion discussed in the Introduction and Section 2. Then, using them as building
blocks, we construct full SMPE strategy profiles.
5.1 Modes of Persuasion
Suppose that the sender runs a flow experiment that targets qi when the current belief
is p. Then, the belief jumps to qi at rate λp(1 − p)/|qi − p|. Absent jumps, it moves
continuously according to (2). Therefore, given the sender’s value function V (·), her flow
benefit is given by21
v(p; qi) := λ
p(1− p)
|qi − p|
(V (qi)− V (p))− sgn(qi − p)λp(1− p)V
′(p).
At each point in time, the sender can choose any countable mixture over different
experiments. Therefore, at each p, her flow benefit from optimal persuasion is equal to
v(p) := max
(αi,qi)i
∑
qi 6=p
αiv(p; qi) subject to
∑
i∈N
αi = 1. (3)
The function v(p) represents the gross flow value from experimentation. If p /∈ W then
the sender simply compares this to the flow cost c. Specifically, if p > p∗, then the
receiver takes action r immediately, and thus V (p) = v for all p > p∗. It follows that
v(p) = 0 < c, so it is optimal for the sender to pass, which is intuitive. If p < p∗ then the
sender has only one instant to persuade the receiver, and therefore experiments only when
v(p) ≥ c: if v(p) < c then persuasion is so unlikely that she prefers to pass. If p ∈ W , then
in equilibrium, the sender must continue to experiment, which suggests that v(p) ≥ c.
When the sender’s optimal solution involves experimentation, her value function V (·) is
adjusted so that her flow benefit v(p) coincides with the corresponding flow cost c. More
formally, v(p) = c is the HJB equation that the sender’s value function must satisfy.
21sgn(x) denotes the sign function that assigns 1 if x > 0, 0 if x = 0, and −1 if x < 0. Note that the
sender’s value function is not everywhere differentiable in all equilibria. Here, we ignore this to give a
simplified argument illustrating the properties of the optimal strategy for the sender. The formal proofs
can be found in Appendix B.
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Figure 6: Optimal Poisson jump targets for different values of p. The solid curve represents
the sender’s value function in an SMPE with p∗ and p
∗.
The following proposition shows that the potentially daunting task of characterizing
the sender’s equilibrium strategy reduces to searching among a small set of experiments,
instead of all feasible experiments, at each belief.
Proposition 1. Consider an SMPE where the receiver’s strategy is given by p∗ < pˆ < p
∗.
(a) For all p ∈ (0, 1), there exists a best response that uses at most two experiments,
(α1, q1) and (α2, q2).
(b) Suppose that V (·) is non-negative, increasing, and strictly convex over (p∗, p
∗], and
V (p∗)/p∗ ≤ V
′(p∗).
(i) If p ∈ (p∗, p
∗), then α1 + α2 = 1, q1 = p
∗, and q2 = 0.
(ii) If p < p∗, then either α1 = α2 = 0 (i.e., the sender passes), or α1 = 1 and
q1 = p∗ or q1 = p
∗.
For part (a) of Proposition 1, notice that the right-hand side in equation (3) is linear
in each αi and the constraint
∑
i∈N αi ≤ 1 is also linear. Therefore, by the standard linear
programming logic, there exists a solution that makes use of at most two experiments,
one below p and the other above p.22 This result implies that v(p) can be written as
v(p) = max
(α1,q1),(α2,q2)
λp(1− p)
[
α1
V (q1)− V (p)
q1 − p
+ α2
V (q2)− V (p)
p− q2
− (α1 − α2)V
′(p)
]
,
subject to α1 + α2 = 1 and q2 < p < q1.
Part (b) of Proposition 1 states that if V (·) satisfies certain properties, which will
be shown to hold in equilibrium later, then there are only three candidates for optimal
Poisson jump targets, 0, p∗, and p
∗, regardless of p ∈ (0, p∗). To see this, observe that
22One may wonder why we allow for two experiments. In fact, linearity implies that there exists
a maximizer that puts all weight on a single experiment. Mixing, however, is necessary to obtain an
admissible Markov strategy. For example, if p is an absorbing belief, then admissibility requires that the
stationary strategy be used at that belief, requiring two experiments. See Section A.1 for details.
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q1 maximizes (V (q)− V (p))/(q − p) (the slope of V between p and q1) subject to q > p,
while q2 minimizes (V (q)− V (p))/(p− q) (the slope between q2 and p) subject to q < p.
As shown in Figure 6, under the given assumptions on V (·), if p ∈ (p∗, p
∗) then q1 = p
∗
and q2 = 0 are optimal (see p3 and the dotted lines). Similarly, if p < p∗ then q2 = 0 is
optimal and q1 is either p∗ (see p2 and the dotted line) or p
∗ (see p1 and the dash-dotted
line).
Proposition 1 implies that the sender makes use of the following three modes of per-
suasion while p < p∗.
R-drifting experiment: This corresponds to choosing α2 = 1 and q2 = 0, that is, the
sender uses an experiment that generates Poisson jumps to 0 at (unconditional) rate λ(1−
p), upon which the receiver immediately takes action ℓ. In the absence of Poisson jumps,
p continuously drifts rightward at rate p˙ = λp(1−p). Targeting q2 = 0 is explained by the
same logic as selecting zero as the belief that induces action ℓ in the static model: the jump
to zero is less likely than jump to any other q < p, as the arrival rate λp(1− p)/(p− q) is
increasing in q. Intuitively, this experiment can be interpreted as the strategy of building
the receiver’s confidence slowly but steadily. This strategy has low risks of losing the
receiver’s attention and, therefore, is particularly useful when the current belief is already
close to p∗, in which case the sender can achieve persuasion relatively quickly and at low
cost.
L-drifting experiment: This corresponds to choosing α1 = 1 and q1 = p
∗ or possibly
q1 = p∗ if p < p∗. In other words, the sender generates rightward Poisson jumps that lead
to either p∗ or p
∗. In the absence of Poisson jumps, the belief continuously drifts leftward
at rate p˙ = −λp(1− p). This strategy is the polar opposite of the R-drifting experiment.
It can yield fast success, but the success is unlikely to happen. In addition, when there
is no success, the receiver’s confidence diminishes. As is intuitive, this strategy is useful
when the current belief is significantly away from the target belief and, therefore, the
sender has a strong incentive to take risks.
Stationary experiment: This arises when the sender targets two beliefs, q1 = p
∗
and q2 = 0, with equal weights (α1 = α2).
23 In this case, unless the belief jumps to
0 or p∗, it stays constant (thus, “stationary”). This can be interpreted as a mixture
between R-drifting and L-drifting experiments and, therefore, combines their strengths
and weaknesses. Naturally, this strategy is useful when p is not so close to p∗ or p∗.
23We will show that any other mixture (in which α1 6= α2) never arises in equilibrium.
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5.2 Equilibrium Characterization
We now explain how the sender optimally combines the three modes of persuasion intro-
duced in Section 5.1, and provide a full description of the unique SMPE strategy profile
for each set of parameter values.
The structure of the sender’s equilibrium strategy depends on two conditions. The
first condition concerns how demanding the persuasion target p∗ is:
p∗ ≤ η ≈ 0.943. (C1)
As explained later, this condition determines whether the sender always prefers the R-
drifting strategy to the stationary strategy or not; η is the largest value of p∗ such that the
sender prefers the former strategy to the latter for all p < p∗. Notice that this condition
holds for p∗ close to pˆ, as with a strategy that approximates the KG solution (as long as
pˆ ≤ η).
The structure of the sender’s equilibrium strategy also depends on the following con-
dition:
v > Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗). (C2)
The left-hand side quantifies the sender’s gains when she successfully persuades the re-
ceiver and induces action r, while the right-hand side represents the corresponding gains
by the receiver.24 If (C2) holds, then the sender has a stronger incentive to experiment
than the receiver, and thus p∗ (the belief below which some player wishes to stop) is
determined by the receiver’s incentives. Conversely, if (C2) fails, then the sender is less
eager to experiment, and thus p∗ is determined by the sender’s incentives.
We first provide an equilibrium characterization for the case where (C2) is satisfied.
Proposition 2. Fix p∗ ∈ (pˆ, 1) and suppose that v > Ur(p
∗) − Uℓ(p
∗). For each c suffi-
ciently small, there exists a unique SMPE such that the waiting region has upper bound
p∗. The waiting region is W = [p∗, p
∗) for some p∗ < pˆ, and the sender’s equilibrium
strategy is as follows:25
(a.i) In the waiting region when p∗ ∈ (pˆ, η): the sender plays the R-drifting strategy with
left-jumps to 0 for all p ∈ [p∗, p
∗).
(a.ii) In the waiting region when p∗ ∈ (η, 1):26 there exist cutoffs p∗ < ξ < πLR < p
∗
such that for p ∈ [p∗, ξ) ∪ (πLR, p
∗), the sender plays the R-drifting strategy with
24As explained in Section 2, the payoffs of the two players are directly comparable, because their
information cost c is normalized to be the same. When they have different information costs, it suffices
to interpret the payoffs in (C2) as relative to each player’s individual information cost.
25It is important for existence of the sender’s best response that the waiting region is W = [p∗, p
∗).
See Lemma 15 in Appendix B.
26Notice that in the knife-edge case when p∗ = η, there are two SMPEs, one as in (a.i) and another as
in (a.ii). In the latter, however, πLR = ξ and the L-drifting strategy is not used in the waiting region.
The two equilibria are payoff-equivalent but exhibit very different dynamic behavior when p0 ∈ [p∗, ξ].
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p∗ ∈ (pˆ, η) : |
0
——︸︷︷︸
pass
πℓL←−←−︸ ︷︷ ︸
jump:p∗
π0←−←−︸ ︷︷ ︸
jump:p∗
p∗−→−→−→−→−→−→−→−→−→︸ ︷︷ ︸
R-drifting, jump to:0
p∗——————————︸ ︷︷ ︸
pass
|
1
p∗ ∈ (η, 1) : |
0
——︸︷︷︸
pass
πℓL←−←−︸ ︷︷ ︸
jump:p∗
π0←−←−︸ ︷︷ ︸
jump:p∗
p∗−→−→−→−→︸ ︷︷ ︸
jump:0
ξ︸︷︷︸
stationary
←−←−←−︸ ︷︷ ︸
jump:p∗
πLR−→−→−→−→︸ ︷︷ ︸
jump:0
p∗———︸ ︷︷ ︸
pass
|
1
Figure 7: The sender’s SMPE strategies in Proposition 2, that is, when v > Ur(p
∗)−Uℓ(p
∗).
left-jumps to 0; for p = ξ, she uses the stationary strategy with jumps to 0 or p∗;
and for p ∈ (ξ, πLR], she adopts the L-drifting strategy with right-jumps to p
∗.
(b) Outside the waiting region: there exist cutoffs 0 < πℓL < π0 < p∗ such that for
p < πℓL, the sender passes; for p ∈ (πℓL, π0), she uses the L-drifting strategy with
jumps to q = p∗; and for p ∈ [π0, p∗), she uses the L-drifting strategy with jumps to
q = p∗.
The lower bound of the waiting region p∗ converges to zero as c→ 0.
Figure 7 summarizes the sender’s SMPE strategy in Proposition 2, depending on
whether p∗ < η or not. If p∗ ∈ (pˆ, η), then the sender uses only R-drifting experiments in
the waiting region [p∗, p
∗). If p∗ > η, then she also employs L-drifting experiments and
the stationary experiment for a range of beliefs.27 In order to understand this difference,
recall from Section 5.1 that R-drifting experiments are particularly useful when p is close
to p∗. If p∗ < η, then the sender would not want to deviate from R-drifting at any
p < p∗. If p∗ > η, however, R-drifting is no longer uniformly optimal for the sender: if p
is sufficiently small, then it would take too long for the sender to gradually move p to p∗
through R-drifting. In that case, other experiments that are more risky but can generate
faster success than R-drifting experiments can be preferred. The structure of our model
then implies that there exists a point ξ ∈ (p∗, p
∗) around which L-drifting is optimal
if p > ξ, while R-drifting is optimal if p < ξ. In other words, ξ is an absorbing point
towards which the belief converges from both sides in the absence of jumps. Consequently,
at p = ξ, the sender plays the stationary strategy and the belief p does not drift any longer.
For an economic intuition, consider a salesperson courting a potentially interested
buyer. If the buyer needs only a bit more reassurance to buy the product, then the
salesperson should adopt a conservative low-risk pitch that slowly “works up” the buyer.
The salesperson may still “slip off” and lose the buyer (i.e., p jumps down to 0). But most
likely, the salesperson “weathers” that risk and gets the buyer over the last hurdle (i.e.,
q = p∗ is reached). This is exactly what our equilibrium persuasion dynamics describes
when p0 is close to p
∗. If p∗ < η, this holds for all p0 ∈ [p∗, p
∗) since the buyer does not
27Although the sender plays the stationary strategy only at one belief ξ, in the absence of Poisson
jumps, p reaches ξ in finite time whenever it starts from p0 ∈ [p∗, πLR]. Therefore, the sender’s strategy
at ξ has a significant impact on the players’ expected payoffs.
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require an extreme belief to be convinced. By contrast, if p∗ > η, the buyer requires a lot
of convincing and there are beliefs where the buyer is rather uninterested (as in a “cold”
call). Then the salesperson must offer a big pitch that can quickly overcome the buyer’s
skepticism. It is likely to fail, but may generate quick, unexpected success, which is better
than to spend a significant amount of time in order to slowly convince a skeptical buyer.
Condition (C2) implies that p∗ is determined by the receiver’s incentive: p∗ is the point
at which the receiver is indifferent between taking action ℓ immediately and waiting (i.e.,
Uℓ(p∗) = U(p∗)). Intuitively, (C2) suggests that the receiver gains less from experimenta-
tion, and is thus less willing to continue, than the sender. Therefore, at the lower bound
p∗, the receiver wants to stop, even though the sender wants to continue persuading the
receiver (i.e., V (p∗) > 0).
When p < p∗, the sender plays only L-drifting experiments, unless she prefers to pass
(below πℓL). This is intuitive, because the receiver would take action ℓ immediately unless
the sender generates an instantaneous jump. It is intriguing, though, that the sender’s
target posterior can be either p∗ or p
∗, depending on how close p is to p∗: in the sales
context used above, if the buyer is fairly skeptical, then the salesperson needs to use a big
pitch. But, depending on how skeptical the buyer is, she may try to get enough attention
only for the buyer to stay engaged (targeting q = p∗) or use an even bigger pitch to
convince the prospect to buy outright (targeting q = p∗). If p is just below p∗ (see p2 in
Figure 6), then the sender can jump into the waiting region at a high rate: note that the
arrival rate approaches∞ as p tends to p∗. In this case, it is optimal to target p∗, thereby
maximizing the arrival rate of Poisson jumps: the salesperson is sufficiently optimistic
about her chance of grabbing the buyer’s attention, so she only aims to make the buyer
stay. If p is rather far away from p∗ (see p1 in Figure 6), then the sender does not enjoy
a high arrival rate. In this case, it is optimal to maximize the sender’s payoff conditional
on Poisson jumps, which she gets by targeting p∗: the salesperson tries to sell her product
right away and if it does not succeed, then she just lets it go.
Next, we provide an equilibrium characterization for the case when (C2) is violated.
Proposition 3. Fix p∗ ∈ (pˆ, 1) and assume that v ≤ Ur(p
∗) − Uℓ(p
∗). For each c suffi-
ciently small, there exists a unique SMPE such that the waiting region has upper bound
p∗. The waiting region is W = (p∗, p
∗) for some p∗ < pˆ, and the sender’s equilibrium
strategy is as follows:28
(a.i) In the waiting region when p∗ ∈ (pˆ, η): there exists a cutoff πLR ∈ W such that for
p ∈ (πLR, p
∗), the sender uses the R-drifting strategy with left-jumps to 0; and for
p ∈ (p∗, πLR), she uses the L-drifting strategy with right-jumps to p
∗.
(a.ii) In the waiting region when p∗ ∈ (η, 1): there exist cutoffs p∗ < πLR < ξ < πLR < p
∗,
such that for p ∈ [πLR, ξ) ∪ [πLR, p
∗), the sender plays the R-drifting strategy with
28It is important that the waiting region is an open interval. Otherwise the strategy profile violates
admissibility at p∗. See Appendix A.1.
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p∗ ∈ (pˆ, η) : |
0
———︸ ︷︷ ︸
pass
p∗←−←−←−←−←−︸ ︷︷ ︸
L-drifting, jump:p∗
πLR−→−→−→−→−→−→−→−→︸ ︷︷ ︸
R-drifting, jump:0
p∗——————————︸ ︷︷ ︸
pass
|
1
p∗ ∈ (η, 1) : |
0
———︸ ︷︷ ︸
pass
p∗←−←−←−︸ ︷︷ ︸
jump:p∗
πLR−→−→−→−→︸ ︷︷ ︸
jump:0
ξ︸︷︷︸
stationary
←−←−←−←−︸ ︷︷ ︸
jump:p∗
πLR−→−→−→−→︸ ︷︷ ︸
jump: 0
p∗———︸ ︷︷ ︸
pass
|
1
Figure 8: The sender’s SMPE strategy in Proposition 3, that is, when v ≤ Ur(p
∗)−Uℓ(p
∗).
left-jumps to 0; for p = ξ, she adopts the stationary strategy with jumps to 0 or p∗;
and for p ∈ (p∗, πLR)∪ (ξ, πLR), she uses the L-drifting strategy with right-jumps to
p∗.
(b) Outside the waiting region the sender passes.
The lower bound of the waiting region p∗ converges to zero as c tends to 0.
Figure 8 describes the persuasion dynamics in Proposition 3. There are two main
differences from Proposition 2. First, if p < p∗ then the sender simply passes: recall
that in Proposition 2, there exists πℓL ∈ (0, p∗) such that the sender plays L-drifting
experiments whenever p ∈ (πℓL, p∗). Second, when p is just above p∗, the sender adopts
L-drifting experiments, and thus the game may stop at p∗: recall that in Proposition 2,
the sender always plays R-drifting experiments just above p∗, and the game never ends
by the belief reaching p∗. Both these difference are precisely due to the failure of (C2): if
v ≤ Ur(p
∗)−Uℓ(p
∗) then the sender is less willing to continue than the receiver, and thus
p∗ is determined by the sender’s participation constraint (i.e., V (p∗) = 0). This implies
that the sender has no incentive to experiment once p falls below p∗. In addition, when
p is just above p∗, the sender goes for a big pitch by targeting p
∗ and, therefore, play
L-drifting experiments.29
Invoking the salesperson’s problem again, (C2) fails (i.e., v ≤ Ur(p
∗) − Uℓ(p
∗) holds)
when either the salesperson is not so motivated, perhaps because of her compensation
structure, or the stake to the buyer is sufficiently large. In this case, the salesperson
prefers to make big sales pitches that can sell the product quickly (i.e., targeting p∗) until
she runs down the buyer’s confidence to p∗.
29To provide further intuition for the difference, we note that in Proposition 2, p∗ is determined by the
receiver’s participation constraint. In other words, the receiver does not let the sender experiment for
all beliefs where the sender would like to. When using the confidence spending L-drifting strategy, this
implies that the sender is stopped earlier than she would like, which diminishes its value. By contrast,
the R-drifting strategy’s value is unaffected by a high p∗, since it builds confidence and moves the belief
away from p∗. Hence, the sender does not use the L-drifting strategy stopping at p∗ in Proposition 2.
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6 Concluding Discussions
We conclude by discussing two important modeling assumptions and suggesting some
directions for future research.
6.1 Discrete Time Foundation
Our timing structure as well as feasible information structures can be micro-founded by
the following discrete time model. Time consists of discrete periods k = 0, 1, ..., with
period length ∆. We consider only short period lengths ∆ ∈ (0, 1/λ). At the beginning of
period k = 0, 1, ..., (unless the game has ended before), the sender performs experiments
whose outcomes are realized after the elapse of time ∆. At the end of that period, after
observing the experiments and their outcomes, the receiver takes an action a ∈ {ℓ, r, w}.
Either of the first two actions ends the game, whereas w moves the game to the next
period k + 1.
In any period k, the sender allocates a share αi of resources to experiment i, which
has the following binary form:
Binary-signal experiment i
state/signal L-signal R-signal
L xi 1− xi
R 1− yi yi
An information structure in discrete time is given by a countable set of experiments
{(αi, xi, yi)}i∈N with weights αi, as in the continuous time formulation. We impose the
constraints (αi, xi, yi) ∈ [0, 1]
3 and 1 ≤ xi + yi ≤ 1 + αiλ∆ for all i, and
∑
i∈N αi ≤ 1.
30
The shares could be interpreted as the intensities of messages sent simultaneously.
Observe that as ∆ → 0, xi + yi → 1 for all i (i.e., the experiments become unin-
formative), which again captures the idea that information takes time to generate and
communicate. It is routine to show that a mixture of Poisson experiments (αi, qi)i∈N sat-
isfying the arrival rates (1) and the drift rates (2) can be obtained in the limit as ∆→ 0
from feasible discrete time information structures.
6.2 Discounting
The players in our model incur flow costs but they do not discount their future payoffs.
This assumption simplifies the analysis significantly. In particular, it allows us to derive
the value functions associated with the three main modes of persuasion in closed form. The
assumption, however, has no qualitative impact on our main results. Specifically, consider
30This discrete-time foundation for our class of Poisson experiments appeared in Che and Mierendorff
(2019). Arguably, the richness of the experiments did not play an important role in that paper, since
conclusive experiments with qi = 0 or qi = 1 always prove optimal for a single decision maker.
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an extension of our model in which there are both flow costs and discounting. SMPEs
in such a model would converge to those in our model as the discount rate converges to
zero. Therefore, all of our results are robust to the introduction of a small amount of
discounting.
If one considers a model with only discounting (i.e., without flow cost c), however,
the persuasion dynamics presented in Section 5 needs some modification. Among other
things, the sender will never voluntarily stop experimentation: recall that in our flow-cost
model, the sender never experiments if the belief p is sufficiently close to 0 (below πℓL).
When there is only discounting, the opportunity cost of experimentation is 0, no matter
how small p is (i.e., no matter how unlikely persuasion is to succeed). This implies that the
lower bound p∗ of the waiting region is always determined by the receiver’s participation
constraint, as in our Proposition 2. In addition, at the lower bound p∗, the sender will
play either R-drifting experiments or the stationary strategy, because she always prefers
playing the stationary strategy (which ensures the belief to stay within the waiting region)
to L-drifting experiments at p∗ (which may move the belief out of the waiting region).
Nevertheless, the main economic lessons from our flow-cost model are likely to apply
to the discounting version. Specifically, all three theorems in Section 4 would continue to
hold.31 Furthermore, the advantages of the three main modes of persuasion remain un-
changed. Therefore, the persuasion dynamics is also likely to be similar to those described
in Propositions 2 and 3, provided that the belief is not so close to p∗. In particular, if p
is rather close to p∗, then the sender will play only R-drifting experiments. But, if p is
sufficiently far away from p∗, then the sender combines the three modes of persuasion as
in the case of p∗ > η in Propositions 2 and 3.
6.3 Directions for Future Research
We studied a dynamic persuasion model in which real information takes time to generate
and neither the sender nor the receiver has commitment power over future actions. There
are several variations of our model that could be worth investigating. For example, one
may consider a model in which the sender faces the same flow information constraint as in
our model but has full commitment power over her dynamic strategy: given our discussion
in Section 3, it is straightforward that the sender can approximately implement the KG
outcome. However, it is non-trivial to characterize the sender’s optimal dynamic strategy.
31The proofs of Theorems 1 and 3 can be readily modified. For Theorem 2, one can show that the
main economic logic behind it (namely, “the power of beliefs” explained at the end of Section 3) holds
also with discounting. To be formal, let ρ denote the common discount rate. Then, it suffices to modify
the argument in footnote 17 as follows:
ρUr(p
∗) ≤ λ(1− p∗)(uLℓ − Ur(p
∗)) + λp∗(1− p∗)U ′r(p
∗)⇔ p∗ ≤ p :=
(
uLℓ − u
L
r
)
λ− uLr ρ(
uLℓ − u
L
r
)
λ+ (uRr − u
L
r )ρ
.
Notice that p approaches 1 as ρ tends to 0.
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More broadly, the rich persuasion dynamics found in our equilibrium owes a great deal
to the general class of Poisson experiments we allow for. At first glance, allowing for the
information to be chosen from such a rich class of experiments at each point in time might
appear extremely complex to analyze, and a clear analysis might seem unlikely. Yet, the
model produced a remarkably precise characterization of the sender’s optimal choice of
information—namely, not just when to stop acquiring information but more importantly
what type of information to search for. This modeling innovation may fruitfully apply to
other dynamic settings.
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A Continuous Time Formulation
A.1 Markov Strategies in Continuous time
An information structure was defined as a collection (αi, qi)i∈N of experiments, where each
(αi, qi) specifies a Poisson experiment with jump-targets qi and associated weight αi. The
set of feasible information structures is thus given by
I =
{
(αi, qi)i∈N
∣∣∣∣∣αi ≥ 0;
∞∑
i=1
αi ≤ 1; qi ∈ [0, 1]
}
.
We define a game in Markov strategies. The sender’s strategy is a measurable function
σS : [0, 1]→ I that maps the belief p to an information structure σS(p).32 The receiver’s
strategy is a measurable function σR : [0, 1] → A, that maps the belief p to an action
σR(p) ∈ A := {ℓ, r, w}. We impose the following admissibility restrictions in order to
ensure that a strategy profile σ = (σS, σR) yields a well defined outcome.
Admissible Strategies for the Sender. Our first restriction ensures that σS gives
rise to a well-defined evolution of the (common) belief about the state.33 For a Markov
strategy σS(p), with experiments (αi(p; σ
S), qi(p; σ
S))i∈N, Bayesian updating leads to the
following integral equation for the belief pt:
34
pt =
p0e
−λ
∫
t
0
(α+s −α
−
s )ds
p0e
−λ
∫
t
0
(α+s −α
−
s )ds + (1− p0)
, (4)
where α+t =
∑
i:qi(pt;σS)>pt
αi(pt; σ
S) is the total weight on upward jumps at time t, and
α−t =
∑
i:qi(pt;σS)<pt
αi(pt; σ
S) is the total weight on downward jumps at time t. To define
admissibility formally, we also introduce the following discrete time approximation. For
period length ∆ > 0, let
p˜(k+1)∆ =
p˜ke
−λ∆(α+
k∆
−α−
k∆
)
p˜ke
−λ∆(α+
k∆
−α−
k∆
) + (1− p˜k)
.
This can be used to define p˜k∆ recursively for each p˜0 = p0, and yields a step-function
p∆t := p˜⌊t/∆⌋∆.
Definition 2. A measurable function σS : [0, 1] → I is an admissible strategy for the
32We can take I to be a subset of R2N, the set of sequences (α1, q1), (α2, q2), . . . in R
2, with the product
σ-algebra B(R2N) = B(R2)⊗ B(R2)⊗ . . ., where B(R2) is the Borel σ-algebra on R2.
33In this part, we follow Klein and Rady (2011), with the difference that in their model, the evolution
of beliefs is jointly controlled by two players. Given that in our model, only the sender controls the
information structures, we can dispense with their assumption that Markov strategies are constant on
the elements of a finite interval partition of the state space.
34The corresponding differential equation is given by p˙t = −
(
α+t − α
−
t
)
λpt(1− pt).
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sender if for all p0 ∈ [0, 1],
(a) there exists a solution to (4), and
(b) if there are multiple solutions to (4), then the pointwise limit lim∆→0 p
∆
t exists and
solves (4).
This definition imposes two restrictions on Markov strategies. First, there must be a
solution to (4). Indeed, there are Markov strategies for which no solution exists. Consider,
for example, a strategy of the following form:
σS(p) =

(α = 1, q = 1), if p ≥ p
′,
(α = 1, q = 0), if p < p′.
This strategy does not lead to a well-defined evolution of the belief if p0 is given by the
“absorbing belief” p0 = p
′. To satisfy admissibility, we can set σS(p) = ((α1 = 1/2, q1 =
1), (α2 = 1/2, q1 = 0)), while keeping the strategy otherwise unchanged.
The second restriction guarantees that if there are multiple solutions, we can select
one of them by taking the pointwise limit of the discrete time approximation. Consider,
for example, the following strategy:
σS(p) =

(α = 1, q = 0), if p ≥ p
′,
(α = 1, q = 1), if p < p′.
(5)
If p0 = p
′, then there is an “obvious” solution p1t =
p′eλt
p′eλt+(1−p′)
> p′ for t > 0. However,
there exists another solution p2t =
p′e−λt
p′e−λt+(1−p′)
consistent with p0 = p
′. But, in discrete
time, p˜∆ > p
′ for any ∆ > 0, and thus lim∆→0 p
∆
t = p
1
t . This means that the strategy
in (5) is admissible, while the latter strategy with p2t is not. In general, when there are
multiple solutions, admissibility enables us to select the “obvious” one that would be
obtained from the discrete time approximation. With this selection, admissibility of the
sender’s strategy guarantees a well defined belief for all t > 0 and all prior beliefs p0.
Admissible Strategy Profiles. In addition to a well defined evolution of beliefs, we
need to ensure that a strategy profile σ = (σS, σR) leads to a well defined stopping time
for any initial belief p0. Consider for example the function
σR(p) =

w if p ≤ p
′,
r if p > p′.
If the sender uses the (admissible) Markov strategy given by σS(p) = (α = 1, q = 0) for all
p, and the prior belief is p0 < p
′, then the function σR(p) does not lead to a well-defined
stopping time. To be concrete, suppose that the true state is ω = R. In this case, no
28
Poisson jumps occur, and the belief drifts upwards. Let t′ denote the time at which the
belief reaches p′. The receiver’s strategy implies that for any t ≤ t′, the receiver plays w
and for any t > t′, the receiver has stopped before t. Hence, the stopping time is not well
defined. Clearly, the following modified strategy fixes the problem:
σˆR′(p) =

w if p > p
′,
r if p ≤ p′.
This example demonstrates that we need a joint restriction on the sender’s and the re-
ceiver’s strategies to ensure a well defined outcome.
To formally define admissibility, we need the following notation: for a given strategy
of the receiver σR, let W =
{
p ∈ [0, 1]
∣∣σR(p) = w} and S = [0, 1] \W be the receiver’s
waiting region and stopping region, respectively, and denote the closures of these sets by
W and S.
Definition 3. A strategy profile σ = (σS, σR) is admissible if (i) σS is an admissible
strategy for the sender, and (ii) for each p ∈ W ∩ S, either p ∈ S, or if p /∈ S, then there
exits ε > 0 such that pt(p) ∈ W for all t < ε, where pt(p) = lim∆→0 p
∆
t is the selected
solution to (4) with p0 = p.
Requirement (i) guarantees that the sender’s strategy gives rise to a well defined belief
at all t > 0 for all prior beliefs regardless of the receiver’s strategy. Requirement (ii)
ensures that for any belief p ∈ W , the belief evolution is such that absent jumps the belief
remains in the waiting region.
One may wonder why we do not simply require that the stopping region is a closed
set. This is stronger than requirement (ii) and it turns out that in some cases it can lead
to non-existence of an equilibrium.35
Payoffs and Equilibrium. Let σ = (σS, σR) be a profile of strategies. If σ is not admis-
sible, then both players receive −∞ from playing the strategy profile. If σ is admissible,
then for each prior belief p0, both players’ expected payoffs are well-defined:
V σ(p0) = v P
[
σR(pτ ) = r
∣∣p0]− cE [∫ τ
0
1{
∑
αi(pt)6=0}dt
∣∣∣∣p0
]
for the sender, and
Uσ(p0) = E
[
UσR(pτ )(pτ )− c
∫ τ
0
1{
∑
αi(pt)6=0}dt
∣∣∣∣p0
]
35For example, in the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2, we have S = [0, p∗) ∪ [p
∗, 1]. If we
require S to be closed and set S = [0, p∗] ∪ [p
∗, 1] instead, the sender does not have a best response for
p ∈ (π0, p∗) since v(p; qi) fails to be upper semi-continuous in qi at qi = p∗.
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for the receiver, where τ is the stopping time defined by the strategy profile and pτ is the
belief when the receiver stops.
Definition 4 (Markov Perfect Equilibrium). An admissible strategy profile σ = (σS, σR)
is a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE), if
(i) for any p0 ∈ [0, 1] and any admissible strategy profile σˆ = (σˆ
S, σR), V σˆ(p0) ≤ V
σ(p0),
(ii) for any p0 ∈ [0, 1] and any admissible strategy profile σˆ = (σ
S, σˆR), U σˆ(p0) ≤ U
σ(p0),
and
(iii) for any p ∈ S: (refinement)
σS(p) ∈ arg max
(αi,qi)∈I
∑
i:qi 6=p
αi
λp(1− p)
|qi − p|
(
V σ(qi)− 1{σR(p)=r}v
)
− 1{∑αi 6=0}c.
Parts (i) and (ii) in this definition require that no player have a profitable deviation
to a Markov strategy that, together with the opponent’s strategy, forms an admissible
strategy profile. Part (iii) formalizes our refinement. We do not explicitly require that
deviations to non-Markov strategies should not be profitable. This requirement is in fact
hard to formulate since we do not define a game that allows for non-Markov strategies.
However, given the opponent’s strategy, each player faces a Markov decision problem.
Therefore, if there is a policy in this decision problem that yields a higher payoff than the
candidate equilibrium strategy, then there is also a profitable deviation that is Markov.
A.2 Belief-free formulation of feasible information structures in
continuous time.
In this section, we formulate the class of feasible information in continuous time without
reference to beliefs. Denote by I˜ the set of information structures available to the sender.
We have
I˜ =
{
(αi, γi, ωi)i∈N
∣∣∣∣∣ αi ≥ 0;
∞∑
i=1
αi ≤ 1; γi ∈ [λ,∞); ωi ∈ {L,R}
}
.
Let I˜ = (αi, γi, ωi)i∈N ∈ I˜ be a typical information structure. As discussed in section
2, αi is the share of resources allocated to experiment i. An information structure with∑∞
i=1 αi = 0 corresponds to “passing”. For an experiment with αi > 0, the parameter
γi controls the arrival rate of jumps that the experiment generates, and the experiment i
generates Poisson jumps at rate αiγi if the true state is ω = ωi, and at rate αi(γi − λ) if
the true state is ω 6= ωi.
This specification implies that if the current belief is pt, a jump from an experiment
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with ωi = R leads to a posterior
q(pt, γi, R) =
ptγi
ptγi + (1− pt) (γi − λ)
.
Hence the sender can choose any jump target q > pt by setting (where we solved the
previous formula for γi):
γi =
λ(1− pt)q
q − pt
.
Note that this expression for γi (multiplied by αi) is precisely the conditional arrival rate
in state R of the experiment (αi, qi) for qi > p in Section 2. Similarly the arrival rate in
state L is
γi − λ =
λ(1− pt)q − λ(q − pt)
q − pt
=
λpt(1− q)
q − pt
.
Hence, the experiments (αi, γi, R) ∈ [0, 1]× [λ,∞)×{R} specify the Poisson experiments
with upward jumps that were described with reference to current beliefs and posteriors
in Section 2. Similarly, experiments (αi, γi, L) ∈ [0, 1]× [λ,∞)×{L} specify experiments
with downward jumps. Therefore, the set of information structures I˜ describes precisely
the feasible information structures available to the sender as defined in the main text (or
the set I in Appendix A.1).
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B Proofs of Propositions 2 and 3
This appendix provides formal proofs for Propositions 2 and 3, from which Theorem 2
and Corollary 1 are also straightforward to obtain. In Section B.1, we derive the general
value functions that correspond to the three policies, stationary, R-drifting, and L-drifting
experiments. In Section B.2, we define the various cutoffs used in Propositions 2 and 3.
In Section B.3, we show that the strategy profiles given in Propositions 2 and 3 (and
supplemented by the cutoffs defined in Section B.2) indeed constitute equilibria. Finally,
in Section B.4, we show that for c sufficiently small, the strategy profiles in Propositions
2 and 3 are a unique SMPE in each case. To avoid breaking the flow in the presentation,
proofs of most Lemmas are relegated to Appendix C.
The main challenge in the proofs is to characterize the best response of the sender
if the receiver uses a strategy with waiting region (p∗, p
∗), or [p∗, p
∗). Inside the waiting
region, the value function of the sender’s best response must be non-negative and satisfy
the HJB equation36
c = max
(αi,qi)i∈N∈I
∑
qi 6=p
αiv(p; qi), (HJB)
where I denotes the set of feasible information structures (see Appendix A.1). If the
value function satisfies the conditions of Proposition 1.b, then the maximization problem
on the right-hand side can be restricted to information structures (αi, qi)i∈N ∈ Is, where
Is is the set of simple information structures
Is = {(αi, qi)i∈N|q1 = p
∗, q2 = 0, α2 = 1− α1, and αi = 0 for i > 2} ,
so that the sender’s problem is to choose a single variable α = α1. This simplifies the
HJB equation to
c = λp(1− p)max
α
[
α
v − V (p)
p∗ − p
− (1− α)
V (p)
p
− (2α− 1) V ′(p)
]
. (HJB-S)
Characterizing solutions to (HJB-S) involves the three policies discussed in Section B.1
and the cutoffs in Section B.2. In Lemma 15 in Section B.3, we characterize the sender’s
(unrestricted) best response and show that it satisfies the restriction (αi, qi)i∈N ∈ Is.
To prove this, we first construct the best response and the corresponding value function
under the restriction (αi, qi)i∈N ∈ Is. We then show that the value function satisfies the
conditions of Proposition 1.b. This allows us to appeal to Lemmas 13 and 14 (also in
Subsection B.3), to show that the candidate value function satisfies (HJB), which implies
that the sender’s best response under the restriction (αi, qi)i∈N ∈ Is is also an unrestricted
best response. This indirect way of characterizing the sender’s unrestricted best response
36If the value function is not everywhere differentiable, it is a viscosity solution of the HJB equation.
32
is necessary since we do not have a direct proof that the value function satisfies the
conditions of Proposition 1.b.37
The rest of Section B.3 verifies that the strategy profiles given in Propositions 2 and
3 specify a best response for the sender in the stopping region (Lemma 16), and likewise
verifies that the receiver plays a best response to the sender’s strategy (Sections B.3.4
and B.3.5). In Section B.4, we show uniqueness. Given the general observation that
for any waiting region W = [p∗, p
∗) or W = (p∗, p
∗), the sender’s best response uses only
experiments in Is, we can use the characterization of the sender’s best response in Lemma
15 in the uniqueness proof.
B.1 Value Functions
In this section, we derive value functions for the stationary strategy, and the R- and L-
drifting policies, and prove crucial properties for these that will be used in later proofs.
As discussed in the introductory paragraph to this appendix, if the sender is restricted to
information structures in Is, the sender’s value function V (p) satisfies (HJB-S). Similarly,
the receiver’s value function satisfies
c = λp(1− p)
[
α
Ur(p
∗)− U(p)
p∗ − p
− (1− α)
uLℓ − U(p)
p
− (2α− 1)U ′(p)
]
. (HJB-R)
Note that this is not the HJB equation for the receiver’s problem, but it can be used to
derive the receiver’s payoff for any given information acquisition policy of the sender.
B.1.1 Stationary Strategy
Let VS(p) denote the sender’s expected payoff from playing the stationary strategy at
belief p (assuming that the receiver waits at belief p). In the stationary strategy, the
sender devotes equal attention to jumps to 0 and p∗. Setting α = 1/2 in (HJB-S), we
obtain38
VS(p) =
λp(1− p)v − 2c(p∗ − p)
λp∗(1− p)
=
p
p∗
v − CS(p), (6)
where
CS(p) =
2c(p∗ − p)
λp∗(1− p)
. (7)
37Consider for example convexity: Standard arguments to not apply since the sender’s payoff depends
on the receiver’s strategy so that the sender’s value cannot be written as the envelope of linear functions.
38Intuitively, under the stationary strategy, the belief stays constant in the absence of a jump. In
addition, if a jump occurs, either to 0 or to p∗, then the game ends immediately. Therefore, the sender’s
benefit of playing the strategy is equal to the probability of jumping to p∗ times v, while the associated
cost is equal to the expected time of the first jump, either to 0 or p∗, times c. For the receiver’s value
function (below), it suffices to take into account that his payoff is equal to uLℓ if p jumps to 0 and equal
to Ur(p
∗) if p jumps to p∗.
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The corresponding value function of the receiver can be similarly obtained by setting
α = 1/2 in (HJB-R) and rearranging:
US(p) =
p∗ − p
p∗
uLℓ +
p
p∗
Ur(p
∗)− CS(p). (8)
Note that CS(p) is concave, and thus both VS(p) and US(p) are convex over (0, p
∗):
V ′′S (p) = U
′′
S(p) = −C
′′(p) = −
4c(1− p∗)
λp∗(1− p)3
> 0. (9)
B.1.2 R-drifting Strategies
Generic value functions: If the sender uses an R-drifting experiment with jump-
target zero for an interval of beliefs, then the sender’s value function satisfies (HJB-S)
with α = 0 on that interval:
c = −λ(1− p)V+(p) + λp(1− p)V
′
+(p). (10)
Here, V+(p) denotes a generic function that satisfies (10); “+” signifies the upward drift
of the belief. If the sender uses the R-drifting strategy until the belief reaches a stopping
bound q(> p), and the sender’s value at q is given by the boundary condition V (q) = X ,
we can solve the ODE (10) to obtain the particular solution
V+(p; q,X) =
p
q
X − C+(p; q),
where
C+(p; q) =
(
p log
(
q
1− q
1− p
p
)
+ 1−
p
q
)
c
λ
.
Similarly, let U+(p) denote the receiver’s generic value function from the R-drifting
strategy with jumps to zero. It satisfies (HJB-R) with α = 0:
c = λ(1− p)
(
uLℓ − U+(p)
)
+ λp(1− p)U ′+(p). (11)
For a boundary condition U(q) = X , we obtain the particular solution
U+(p; q,X) =
q − p
q
uLℓ +
p
q
X − C+(p; q).
Note that, as for VS(p) and US(p), V+(p) and U−(p) are convex:
V ′′+(p; q,X) = U
′′
+(p; q,X) = −C
′′
+(p; q) =
c
λp(1− p)2
> 0. (12)
Here and in the following, we are slightly abusing notation for the partial derivatives of
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these functions with respect to p, e.g., V ′′+(p; q,X) = ∂
2V+(p; q,X)/∂p
2.
R-drifting with stopping bound p∗: In Propositions 2 and 3, for p close to p∗ the
sender uses the R-drifting strategy with a stopping bound p∗, and at p∗ the receiver
takes action r immediately. Hence, we have the boundary condition V (p∗) = v for the
sender and U(p∗) = Ur(p
∗) for the receiver. To avoid cluttering notation, we denote the
corresponding value functions by VR(p) and UR(p), suppressing the dependence on p
∗.
Then, we have
VR(p) := V+(p; p
∗, v) =
p
p∗
v − C+(p; p
∗), (13)
UR(p) := U+(p; p
∗, Ur(p
∗)) =
p∗ − p
p∗
uLℓ +
p
p∗
Ur(p
∗)− C+(p; p
∗). (14)
Comparison of VR(p) and VS(p): Clearly, the sender will not use R-drifting with
stopping bound p∗ at beliefs where VR(p) < VS(p). We now derive conditions under which
VR(p) < VS(p) can arise for some beliefs p ∈ (0, p
∗).
From (6) and (8), we have
VS(p
∗) = v = VR(p
∗), (15)
V ′S(p
∗) =
v
p∗
+
2c
λp∗ (1− p∗)
>
v
p∗
+
c
λp∗ (1− p∗)
= V ′R(p
∗), (16)
VS(0) = −2
c
λ
< −
c
λ
= lim
p→0
VR(p). (17)
Hence, VS(p) is dominated by VR(p) for p close to 0 and p
∗. This implies that if VS(p) >
VR(p
∗) for some p ∈ (0, p∗), then there must be at least two intersection points.
We begin by characterizing intersections between VS(p) and V+(p) (the latter being a
generic solution to (10)). For each p∗ ≥ 8/9, define the following two cutoffs:
ξ1(p
∗) :=
3p∗
4
−
√(
3p∗
4
)2
−
p∗
2
∈
(
0,
3
4
p∗
)
,
ξ2(p
∗) :=
3p∗
4
+
√(
3p∗
4
)2
−
p∗
2
∈
(
3
4
p∗, p∗
)
.
ξ in Propositions 2 and 3 corresponds to ξ1(p
∗). In what follows, we will use ξ1 instead of
ξ.
Lemma 1. Fix p∗ ∈ (pˆ, 1), let V+(p) be a solution to (10), and suppose that V+(p) = VS(p)
for some p ∈ [0, p∗].
(a) If p∗ < 8/9, then V ′+(p) < V
′
S(p).
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(b) If p∗ ≥ 8/9, then
V ′+(p)


< V ′S(p) if p /∈ [ξ1(p
∗), ξ2(p
∗)],
= V ′S(p) if p ∈ {ξ1(p
∗), ξ2(p
∗)},
> V ′S(p) if p ∈ (ξ1(p
∗), ξ2(p
∗)).
Lemma 1.a implies that if p∗ < 8/9 then V+ can cross VS only from above. Since this
rules out the possibility of at least two intersections, it follows that VS(p) < VR(p) for all
p ∈ (0, p∗) if p∗ < 8/9.
Lemma 1.b, together with (15)–(17), also shows how VS and VR can intersect each
other. (17) implies that at the lowest intersection, which we call πSR, VR(p) must cross
VS(p) from above. At the highest intersection which we call πSR, (15)–(16) imply that
VR(p) must cross VS(p) from below. The only possibility for this pattern of intersections to
arise is that πSR ∈ (0, ξ1), πSR ∈ (ξ1, ξ2), and there are no other intersections. This implies
that there are two intersections if VS(ξ1(p
∗)) > VR(ξ1(p
∗)), and there is no intersection if
VS(ξ1(p
∗)) < VR(ξ1(p
∗)). If VS(ξ1(p
∗)) = VR(ξ1(p
∗)), then the two value functions do not
intersect but touch each other at ξ1(p
∗). We define the constant η as the value for p∗ for
which this knife-edge case obtains:39
VS(ξ1(η)) = VR(ξ1(η)).
An explicit solution for η is not available, but numerically we obtain η = .94325 > 8/9.
To complete the comparison of VS(p) and VR(p), the following lemma shows that the
two functions never intersect if p∗ < η, and intersect exactly twice if p∗ > η.
Lemma 2. If p∗ < η, then VR(p) > VS(p) for all p ∈ [0, p
∗). If p∗ = η, then VR(p) ≥ VS(p)
for all p < p∗, with equality holding only when p = ξ1. Finally, if p
∗ > η, then there are
two points of intersection πSR ∈ (0, ξ1) and πSR ∈ (ξ1, ξ2).
R-drifting followed by stationary strategy: We have shown that at ξ1, the sender
strictly prefers the stationary strategy to R-drifting with stopping bound p∗, if and only
if p∗ > η. In this case, Propositions 2 and 3 prescribe that for some p < ξ1, the sender use
the R-drifting experiment until the belief drifts to ξ1, where she switches to the stationary
strategy. Let VRS(p) and URS(p) denote the value functions that derive from this dynamic
39Note that in this condition η enters both through ξ1(η), and as an omitted argument p
∗ = η of VS
and VR. That is, we have
ξ1(η)
η
v −
2c(η − ξ1(η))
λη(1 − ξ1(η))
=
ξ1(η)
η
v −
(
ξ1(η) log
(
η
1− η
1− ξ1(η)
ξ1(η)
)
+ 1−
ξ1(η)
η
)
c
λ
.
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strategy. From the generic solutions, we get (for p < ξ1)
VRS(p) = V+(p; ξ1, VS(ξ1)) =
p
p∗
v − C+(p, ξ1)−
p
ξ1
CS(ξ1), (18)
URS(p) = U+(p; ξ1, US(ξ1)) =
p∗ − p
p∗
uLℓ +
p
p∗
Ur(p
∗)− C+(p, ξ1)−
p
ξ1
CS(ξ1). (19)
B.1.3 L-drifting strategies
Generic Value Functions: If the sender uses the L-drifting experiment with jumps to
p∗, then her value function satisfies (HJB-S) with α = 1:
c = λp(1− p)
(
v − V−(p)
p∗ − p
− V ′−(p)
)
, (20)
where we use V−(p) to denote a generic function that satisfies (20). For a stopping bound
q < p, and a boundary condition V (q) = X , we obtain the particular solution
V−(p; q,X) :=
p− q
p∗ − q
v +
p∗ − p
p∗ − q
X − C−(p; q), (21)
where
C−(p; q) = −
p∗ − p
p∗(1− p∗)
(
p∗ log
1− q
1− p
+ (1− p∗) log
q
p
− log
p∗ − q
p∗ − p
)
c
λ
. (22)
Similarly, When α = 1, (HJB-R) simplifies to
c = λp(1− p)
(
Ur(p
∗)− U−(p)
p∗ − p
− U ′−(p)
)
. (23)
For a boundary condition U(q) = X , we obtain the following generic solution:
U−(p; q,X) =
p− q
p∗ − q
Ur(p
∗) +
p∗ − p
p∗ − q
X − C−(p; q).
Again, the value functions V−(p; q,X) and U−(p; q,X) are convex in p:
V ′′−(p; q,X) = U
′′
−(p; q,X) = −C
′′
−(p; q) =
(p∗ − p)2 + p∗(1− p∗)
p2(1− p)2(p∗ − p)
c
λ
> 0. (24)
L-drifting with stopping bound p∗: In Proposition 3, the sender uses the L-drifting
experiment with a stopping bound equal to p∗. At p∗, the receiver takes action ℓ, which
yields the boundary conditions V (p∗) = 0 for the sender, and U(p∗) = Uℓ(p∗) for the
receiver. Denoting the associated value functions by VL(p) and UR(p), we get
VL(p) = V−(p; p∗, 0) =
p− p∗
p∗ − p∗
v − C−(p; p∗), (25)
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UL(p) = U−(p; p∗, Uℓ(p∗)) =
p− p∗
p∗ − p∗
Ur(p
∗) +
p∗ − p
p∗ − p∗
Uℓ(p∗)− C−(p; p∗). (26)
L-drifting followed by stationary strategy: If p∗ > η, then Propositions 2 and 3
also prescribe another L-drifting strategy: for an interval above ξ1, the sender uses the
L-drifting strategy with jumps to p∗ until belief reaches ξ1, at which point she switches
to the stationary strategy. We denote the values of this strategy by VLS(p) and URS(p),
respectively:
VLS(p) = V−(p; ξ1, VS(ξ1)) =
p
p∗
v − C−(p; ξ1)−
p∗ − p
p∗ − ξ1
CS(ξ1), (27)
ULS(p) = U−(p; ξ1, US(ξ1)) =
p∗ − p
p∗
uLℓ +
p
p∗
Ur(p
∗)− C−(p; ξ1)−
p∗ − p
p∗ − ξ1
CS(ξ1). (28)
B.1.4 The Crossing Lemma
The following lemma provides a crossing condition for intersections of generic functions
V+(p) and V−(p).
Lemma 3. (Crossing Lemma) Let V+(p) be a solution to (10), and V−(p) a solution to
(20). If V−(p) = V+(p) for some p ∈ (0, p
∗), then
sign
(
V ′+(p)− V
′
−(p)
)
= sign (V−(p)− VS(p)) .
Lemma 3 suggests that the crossing patterns between V+(p) and V−(p) are fully deter-
mined by the relationship between V+(p) = V−(p) and VS(p). This leads to the following
crucial observations.
Lemma 4. Suppose p∗ ∈ [η, 1]. Then
(a) V ′S(ξ1) = V
′
LS(ξ1) = V
′
RS(ξ1), and
(b) VRS(p) > VS(p) for all p ∈ [0, ξ1) and VLS(p) > VS(p) for all p ∈ (ξ1, ξ2).
Moreover, the Crossing Lemma 3 will be crucial to show that the cutoffs used in
Propositions 2 and 3 are well defined (see Section B.2), and that kinks in the value
functions of the strategies specified in Propositions 2 and 3 are convex (see the proof of
Lemma 15).
B.1.5 Additional Notation for the Value Functions
For some proofs and derivations that follow, it is convenient to have a unified notation
for VR(p) and VRS(p), as many arguments apply to both in the same way. To this end,
note that VS(p
∗) = VR(p
∗) = v, and thus VR(p) can be written as
VR(p) = V+(p; p
∗, VS(p
∗)).
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On the other hand, we have VRS(p) = V+(p; ξ1, VS(ξ1)). In other words, the two functions
have an identical structure except for the point at which the value of stationary strategy
is used in the boundary condition. We therefore define
qR :=
{
p∗ if p∗ ≤ η,
ξ1 if p
∗ > η,
and
VRS(p; qR) := V+(p; qR, VS(qR)).
Note that this implies that VRS(p; qR) = VR(p) if p
∗ ≤ η and VRS(p; qR) = VRS(p) if p
∗ > η.
We will also use a similar notation for the receiver: URS(p; qR) := U+(p; qR, US(qR)).
B.2 Cutoffs
We proceed to formally define various cutoffs used in Propositions 2 and 3. As a general
rule for notation, we use φ• to denote cutoffs stemming indifference conditions of the
receiver, and π• to denote those stemming from indifference conditions of the sender. The
subscripts refer to the strategies or actions between which the player is indifferent at the
respective cutoff. For example, at πℓL the sender is indifferent between action ℓ and the
L-drifting strategy.
B.2.1 p: Upper Bound of p∗
In Propositions 2 and 3, the sender always plays R-drifting experiments if the belief p is
close to p∗. A necessary condition for this to be possible in equilibrium is that the receiver
prefers waiting to taking action r, that is, UR(p) ≥ Ur(p) for p ∈ (p
∗ − ε, p∗) for some
ε > 0. The following lemma shows that this is satisfied if and only if p∗ ≤ p, where p is
defined as
p := 1−
1
uLℓ − u
L
r
c
λ
.
Lemma 5 (Crossing of Ur and UR). For any p
∗ ∈ (pˆ, 1), U ′R(p
∗) S U ′r(p∗), if and only if
p∗ S p.
B.2.2 p∗ in Proposition 2
In Proposition 2, the sender uses R-drifting experiments if p is slightly above p∗. The
lower bound p∗ is then given by the belief φℓR at which the receiver is indifferent between
R-drifting and taking action ℓ:
Uℓ(φℓR) = URS(φℓR; qR) =
{
UR(φℓR) if p
∗ ≤ η,
URS(φℓR) if p
∗ > η.
(29)
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Although φℓR is not available in close form, the following lemma shows that the cutoff
φℓR is well defined, and converges to zero as c tends to 0. In the second case (p
∗ > η)
the cutoff is well defined if US(ξ1) exceeds the stopping payoff, which is the case for c
sufficiently small.
Lemma 6. Let p∗ ∈ (pˆ, 1).
(a) If p∗ ≤ η, then there exists a unique belief φℓR ∈ (0, pˆ) that satisfies (29), and
φℓR → 0 as c→ 0.
(b) If p∗ > η, then for c sufficiently small, US(ξ1) > max {Uℓ(ξ1), Ur(ξ1)} and there
exists a unique belief φℓR ∈ (0, pˆ) that satisfies (29). In addition, φℓR → 0 as c→ 0.
Let πℓR denote a similar cutoff for the sender. This cutoff does not appear in the
equilibrium characterization, but it will be useful when we verify the sender’s incentives.
πℓR is given by the sender’s indifference between action ℓ and the R-drifting strategy:
0 = VRS(πℓR; qR) =
{
VR(φℓR) if p
∗ ≤ η,
VRS(φℓR) if p
∗ > η.
(30)
Convexity in p of VRS(p; qR) and limp→0 VRS(p; qR) = −c/λ < 0 imply that πℓR is well
defined for c sufficiently small.40
The next lemma shows that the relationship between φℓR and πℓR is fully determined
by Condition C2. Intuitively, the player who gains more form persuasion has the lower
indifference belief. This also explains why in Proposition 2, where Condition C2 holds,
we defined p∗ = φℓR > πℓR.
Lemma 7. πℓR S φℓR if and only if v T Ur(p∗)− Uℓ(p∗).
B.2.3 p∗ in Proposition 3
Proposition 3 specifies that for p slightly above p∗, the sender uses L-drifting experiments
with stopping bound p∗ given by the belief πℓL, at which the sender is indifferent between
stopping with action ℓ and playing the L-drifting experiment for one more instant:
− c dt+
λπℓL(1− πℓL)
p∗ − πℓL
v dt = 0 ⇐⇒ π2ℓLλv − (λv + c)πℓL + p
∗c = 0. (31)
This quadratic equation has a unique solution in (0, p∗) given by
πℓL =
1
2
+
c
2λv
−
√(
1
2
+
c
2λv
)2
−
cp∗
λv
. (32)
40If p∗ > η, then for c sufficiently small, VRS(ξ1) = VS(ξ1) > 0, so that the intermediate value theorem
implies existence of the cutoff.
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We show that the sender prefers a short period of L-drifting experiment followed by action
ℓ, over immediate stopping with action ℓ, if and only if p∗ ≥ πℓL. Formally, we insert
V (p∗) = 0 in (20) and use simple algebra to obtain
V ′L(p∗) T 0 ⇐⇒ v T
p∗ − p∗
p∗(1− p∗)
c
λ
⇐⇒ p∗ T πℓL. (33)
Let φℓL denote a similar cutoff for the receiver, that is, the belief at which the receiver
is indifferent between stopping with action ℓ and allowing the L-drifting experiment for
one more instant:
− c +
λφℓL(1− φℓL)
p∗ − φℓL
(Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(φℓL))− λφℓL(1− φℓL)U
′
ℓ(φℓL) = 0. (34)
The unique solution on (0, 1) is given by
φℓL =
c+ λ∆U(p∗)−
√
(c+ λ∆U(p∗))2 − 4λc∆U(p∗)p∗
2λ∆U(p∗)
,
where ∆U(p∗) = Ur(p
∗) − Uℓ(p
∗). Analogously to πℓL, the receiver prefers waiting to
taking action ℓ immediately, if and only if p ≥ φℓL. Formally we have
U ′L(p∗) T U ′ℓ(p∗) ⇐⇒ p∗ T φℓL. (35)
As for πℓR and φℓR, Condition C2 determines the relationship between πℓL and φℓL.
As the following lemma shows, the player who benefits more from persuasion has the
lower cutoff. This gives an intuition why for Proposition 3, where C2 is violated, we set
p∗ = πℓL > φℓL.
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Lemma 8. πℓL S φℓL if and only if v T Ur(p∗)− Uℓ(p∗).
The following Lemma shows that for any belief p < p∗, the R-drifting strategy dom-
inates the L-drifting strategy with stopping bound p∗ = πℓL if the cost is sufficiently
low.42
Lemma 9. For any p ∈ (0, p∗), there exists c(p) > 0 such that for all c < c(p), we have
πℓL < p and VL(p) < VR(p) when the stopping bound for VL is p∗ = πℓL.
We will later use the following corollary of Lemma 9, which holds since by Lemma 2,
VR(ξ1) < VS(ξ1) if p
∗ > η.
41The careful reader will wonder why we do not set p∗ > πℓL since the sender’s incentives only rule out
p∗ < πℓL. The argument is more subtle and will become clear in Subsection B.3.5 as well as Subsection
B.4.
42Note however, that πℓL → 0 as c → 0. Therefore Lemma 9 does not imply that the R-drifting
strategy dominates the L-drifting strategy on the whole waiting region. In the lemma, for c < c(p), we
have p∗ = πℓL < p, leaving room for an interval where the L-drifting strategy is not dominated by the
R-drifting strategy.
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Corollary 2. Suppose p∗ > η. If c is sufficiently small and p∗ = πℓL, then VL(ξ1) <
VS(ξ1).
Proof. This is immediate from Lemma 9 and the fact that VR(ξ1) < VS(ξ1).
B.2.4 Cutoffs Derived from Indifference between Modes of Learning
So far, we have considered cutoff beliefs at which the players are indifferent between
experimenting and stopping with some action. Now we define the cutoffs that arise from
the sender’s indifference conditions between different experiments.
πLR in Proposition 3: If p
∗ ≤ η, then we define the cutoff πLR as the point of indiffer-
ence between the L-drifting strategy with stopping bound p∗ and the R-drifting strategy
with stopping bound p∗, that is,
VL(πLR) = VR(πLR), if p∗ ≤ πℓR. (36)
If p∗ > πℓR, then VR(p∗) > 0 = VL(p∗), and we set πLR = p∗. The following lemma shows
that the cutoff is well defined.
Lemma 10. Suppose p∗ ∈ (pˆ, η].
(a) If c is sufficiently small and p∗ ≤ πℓR, then there exists a unique πLR ∈ [p∗, p
∗)
that solves (36). Moreover, VL(p) > VR(p) if p ∈ [p∗, πLR) and VL(p) < VR(p) if
p ∈ (πLR, p
∗). If p∗ > πℓR, then VL(p) < VR(p) for all p ∈ (p∗, p
∗).
(b) If p∗ = πℓL, then πLR → 0 as c→ 0.
πLR in Propositions 2 and 3: For p
∗ > η, we define πLR as the point of indifference
between R-drifting with stopping bound p∗ and L-drifting followed by the stationary
strategy at ξ1:
VR(πLR) = VLS(πLR). (37)
The following lemma shows that the cutoff is well defined.
Lemma 11. Suppose p∗ ∈ (η, 1). Then there is a unique πLR ∈ (ξ1, p
∗) that solves (37).
Moreover, VLS(p) > VR(p) if p ∈ [ξ1, πLR) and VLS(p) < VR(p) if p ∈ (πLR, p
∗).
πLR in Proposition 3: Proposition 3 uses the additional cutoff πLR. We define it as the
point of indifference between L-drifting with stopping bound p∗ and R-drifting followed
by the stationary strategy at ξ1:
VL(πLR) = VRS(πLR) if p∗ ≤ πℓR. (38)
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If p∗ > πℓR, then VRS(p∗) > 0 and we set πLR = p∗. The following Lemma shows that
this cutoff is well defined if p∗ < πℓR and VL(ξ1) < VS(ξ1).
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Lemma 12. Suppose that p∗ ∈ (η, 1). If p∗ < πℓR and VL(ξ1) < VS(ξ1), then there
exists a unique πLR ∈ (p∗, ξ1) that solves (38), VL(p) > VRS(p) if p ∈ [p∗, πLR), and
VL(p) < VRS(p) if p ∈ (πLR, ξ1). If p∗ ≥ πℓR, then VL(p) < VRS(p) for all p ∈ (p∗, ξ1).
B.3 Equilibrium
In this section we show that the strategy profiles specified in Proposition 2 and 3 are
indeed equilibria when c is sufficiently small.
B.3.1 Verifying Sender Optimality in the Waiting Region
We first consider the sender’s strategies in the waiting region (p∗, p
∗). The following lem-
mas provide conditions that can be used to verify the optimality of the sender’s strategy.
Note that they apply unchanged even if the waiting region is the half-open interval [p∗, p
∗).
Lemma 13. (Unimprovability) Let V (p) ≥ 0 be a candidate value function for the sender
that is continuous on [p∗, 1], is strictly convex on (p∗, p
∗), and satisfies V (p) = 0 for
p < p∗, V (p) = v for p ≥ p
∗, p∗V
′(p∗+) ≥ V (p∗+),
44 and V (p) ≥ VS(p) for all p ∈ (p∗, p
∗).
(a) If V (p) is differentiable and satisfies (20) at p ∈ (p∗, p
∗), then V (p) satisfies (HJB)
at p. If V (p) > VS(p), then L-drifting with jumps to p
∗ is the unique optimal policy
at p.
(b) If V (p) is differentiable and satisfies (10) at p ∈ (p∗, p
∗), then V (p) satisfies (HJB)
at p. If V (p) > VS(p), then R-drifting with jumps to 0 is the unique optimal policy
at p.
If the sender’s value function is differentiable for all p ∈ (p∗, p
∗), optimality of a
candidate solution whose value function V (p) satisfies (20) or (10), is shown in two steps.
First, if V (p) ≥ VS(p) for all p ∈ (p∗, p
∗), then the strategy is optimal on the restricted
set of information structures Is, i.e., V (p) satisfies (HJB-S). Second, if it also satisfies
the conditions of Proposition 1.b, then V (p) satisfies (HJB) and the candidate solution
is optimal on the unrestricted set of feasible information structures I. The next lemma
extends this to the case where the value function has convex kinks. In this case, we show
that the value function is a viscosity solution of (HJB). A standard verification argument
then implies that the candidate solution is optimal.
Lemma 14. (Unimprovability with Kinks) Let V (p) be a candidate value function that
satisfies the conditions of Lemma 13. Suppose further that for any p ∈ (p∗, p
∗) where
43Corollary 2 shows that VL(ξ1) < VS(ξ1) holds for c sufficiently small if p
∗ ∈ (η, 1).
44We define V (p−) := limxրp V (x), V
′(p−) := limxրp V
′(x), V (p+) := limxցp V (x), and V
′(p+) :=
limxցp V
′(x).
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V (p) is not differentiable, we have V ′(p−) < V
′(p+), and there exists ε > 0 such that
V (p) satisfies (20) for p′ ∈ (p − ε, p); V (p) satisfies (10) for p′ ∈ (p, p + ε). Then
V (p) is a viscosity solution of (HJB) on (p∗, p
∗). Moreover, if p∗V
′(p∗+) > V (p∗+) and
V (p) > VS(p), then the optimal policy is unique at p if V (p) is differentiable; and the
optimal policy at p can only be R-drifting with jumps to 0 or L-drifting with jumps to p∗
if V (p) is not differentiable at p.45
B.3.2 The Sender’s Best Response in the Waiting Region
The following lemma characterizes the sender’s best response given the waiting region.
Note that p∗ > πℓL in Proposition 2 and p∗ = πℓL in Proposition 3. Therefore, it suffices to
consider the case where p∗ ≥ πℓL. To verify that the strategy profiles in the Propositions
are equilibria, it suffices to consider p∗ ≤ φℓR (cases (a)–(d) in the lemma). For the
uniqueness proof, however, we need to consider all possible p∗ ∈ [πℓL, pˆ).
Lemma 15. Suppose that the receiver plays a strategy with waiting region W = [p∗, p
∗)
or W = (p∗, p
∗), where πℓL ≤ p∗ < pˆ < p
∗ ≤ p. Then, for c sufficiently small, the sender’s
best response and the associated value function V (p) have the following properties in W :
(a) If p∗ ≤ η and p∗ < πℓR, then the sender’s best response is given by
L-drifting with jump to p
∗ if p < πLR,
R-drifting with jump to 0 if p ≥ πLR.
Admissibility requires W = (p∗, p
∗) in this case. The best response is unique for all
p < p∗ if p∗ < η, and for all p 6= ξ if p = η.46 The corresponding value function
satisfies
V (p) = max {VL(p), VR(p)} ≥ VS(p),
with strict inequality for all p < p∗ if p∗ < η, and for all p 6= ξ if p = η.
(b) If p∗ ≤ η and p∗ ≥ πℓR, then the sender’s best response is given by “R-drifting with
jumps to 0” for all p ∈ [p∗, p
∗). It is unique for all p < p∗ if p∗ < η, and for all
p 6= ξ1 if p = η. The value function satisfies V (p) = VR(p) ≥ VS(p), with strict
inequality for all p < p∗ (and p 6= ξ1) if p
∗ < η (p = η).
45This means α ∈ {0, 1} and the policy is unique up to tie-breaking.
46If p = η, then it is also a best response that the sender plays the stationary strategy at ξ.
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(c) If p∗ > η and p∗ < πℓR, then the sender’s best response is given by

L-drifting with jump to p∗ if p ≤ πLR,
R-drifting with jump to 0 if p ∈ [πLR, ξ1),
stationary if p = ξ1,
L-drifting with jump to p∗ if p ∈ (ξ1, πLR],
R-drifting with jump to 0 if p ≥ πLR.
Admissibility requires W = (p∗, p
∗) in this case. The best response is unique up to
tie-breaking at πLR and πLR. The associated value function satisfies
V (p) =


max {VL(p), VRS(p)} > VS(p), if p < ξ1,
VS(ξ1) if p = ξ1,
max {VLS(p), VR(p)} > VS(p), if p ∈ (ξ1, p
∗).
(d) If p∗ > η and p∗ ∈ [πℓR, ξ1), then the sender’s best response is given by

R-drifting with jump to 0 if p ∈ [p∗, ξ1),
stationary if p = ξ1,
L-drifting with jump to p∗ if p ∈ (ξ1, πLR),
R-drifting with jump to 0 if p ∈ [πLR, p
∗).
The best response is unique up to tie-breaking at πLR. The associated value function
satisfies
V (p) =


VRS(p) > VS(p), if p < ξ1,
VS(ξ1) if p = ξ1,
max {VLS(p), VR(p)} > VS(p), if p ∈ (ξ1, p
∗).
(e) If p∗ > η and p∗ ∈ [ξ1, πSR), existence of a best response requires W = [p∗, p
∗). With
W = [p∗, p
∗), the sender’s best response is given by

stationary if p = p∗,
L-drifting with jump to p∗ if p ∈ (p∗, πLR),
R-drifting with jump to 0 if p ∈ [πLR, p
∗).
The best response is unique up to tie-breaking at πLR. The associated value function
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satisfies
V (p) =

VS(ξ1) if p = p
∗,
max {VLS(p), VR(p)} > VS(p), if p ∈ (p
∗, p∗).
(f) If p∗ > η and p∗ ≥ πSR, then the sender’s best response and value function are as in
case (b). The best response is unique and if p 6= πSR. The value function satisfies
V (p) = VR(p) ≥ VS(p), with strict inequality for p 6= πSR.
(g) In all cases, the value function associated with the sender’s best response is strictly
convex on [p∗, p
∗), and satisfies V (p∗−) = v, V (p) > 0 for p > p∗, and p∗V
′(p∗+) ≥
V (p∗+).
B.3.3 The Sender’s Best Response outside the Waiting Region
Lemma 16. Suppose that the receiver uses a strategy with waiting region W = [p∗, p
∗) or
W = (p∗, p
∗), where πℓL ≤ p∗ < pˆ < p
∗ ≤ p, and suppose that c is sufficiently small so
that πℓR is well defined. Then the sender’s best response has the following properties for
p < p∗:
(a) The sender passes whenever p < πℓL.
(b) If πℓL ≤ p∗ ≤ πℓR, then the sender chooses the L-drifting experiment with jumps to
p∗ for all p ∈ (πℓL, p∗).
(c) If p∗ > πℓR and W = [p∗, p
∗), then the sender chooses the L-drifting experiment with
jumps to p∗ for all p ∈ [πℓL, π0) and the L-drifting experiment with jumps to p∗ for
all p ∈ (π0, p∗), where π0 ∈ (πℓL, πℓR) is defined by
V (p∗)
p∗ − π0
=
v
p∗ − π0
⇐⇒ π0 =
p∗v − p
∗V (p∗)
v − V (p∗)
.
(d) If p∗ > πℓR, W = (p∗, p
∗), and V (p∗) > 0, then for p ∈ (π0, p∗) the sender’s best
reply does not exists.
The non-existence in part (d) is the reason why we must allow for both W = (p∗, p
∗),
and W = [p∗, p
∗). The former is required by admissibility to obtain equilibria in which
the sender uses the L-drifting experiment with stopping bound p∗. The latter is required
to ensure the existence of a best response for the sender in equilibria in which V (p∗) > 0.
To prove Lemma 16, we use the following result, which we state as a separate lemma since
it will also be used in other proofs.
Lemma 17. φℓL < φℓR and πℓL < πℓR.
B.3.4 Equilibrium Verification in Proposition 2
Suppose that Condition C2 holds. Lemmas 15 and 16 imply that the sender’s strategy is
a best response in each case. For the receiver, if p ≥ p∗, then it is clearly optimal to stop
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and take action r, because the sender will no longer experiment. We consider the other
cases in more detail below. For the following, recall from Section B.2.2 that p∗ = φℓR in
Proposition 2.
Receiver optimality when p < p∗: If p ∈ (π0, p∗), then the sender plays L-drifting
experiments with jumps to p∗. After observing the signals form this experiment, taking
action ℓ is the receiver’s best response whether a jump to p∗ has occurred or not. Therefore,
it is optimal for the receiver to take action ℓ immediately, without incurring more listening
costs. If p < πℓL, then the sender simply passes and provides no additional information.
Therefore, it is obviously optimal for the receiver to stop and take action ℓ.
It remains to consider beliefs p ∈ [πℓL, π0]. Here, the sender uses L-drifting experiments
with jumps to p∗. By (35), given the sender’s strategy, the receiver’s best response is to
stop if p < φℓL. We complete the proof by showing that for c sufficiently small, φℓL > π0.
Lemma 18. Suppose that Condition C2 holds. Then there exists c(p∗) such that φℓL > π0
if c < c(p∗).
Receiver optimality when p ∈ [p∗, p
∗): First, consider the case where p∗ ≤ η (so that
the sender plays only R-drifting experiments over (p∗, p
∗)). Waiting yields a payoff of
UR(p). Lemma 5 implies that UR(p) > Ur(p) for all p < p
∗, as long as p∗ < p. Since p
approaches 1 as c tends to 0, p∗ < p is guaranteed for c sufficiently small. In addition,
uniqueness of φℓR (see Lemma 6) implies that UR(p) > Uℓ(p) for all p > p∗. It follows
that UR(p) ≥ max{Ur(p), Uℓ(p)} for all p ∈ [p∗, p
∗], with strict inequalities for p ∈ (p∗, p
∗).
This implies that waiting is a best response for p ∈ [p∗, p
∗].
Now consider the case where p∗ > η. First, suppose that p ≥ ξ1. As for the case
where p∗ ≤ η, UR(p) > Ur(p) for p < p
∗. Note that UR(p)→
p∗−p∗
p∗
uLℓ +
p∗
p∗
Ur(p
∗) > Uℓ(p)
as c → 0. This implies that UR(p) ≥ max {Uℓ(p), Ur(p)} for all p ≥ ξ1 if c is sufficiently
small. Next, note that ULS(p) > UR(p) if and only if VLS(p) > VR(p) since the sender
and the receiver incur the same cost. Therefore, whenever the LS-strategy is used on
[ξ1, p
∗], it increases the receiver’s value compared to UR(p). Hence the receiver’s value is
greater or equal UR(p) ≥ max {Uℓ(p), Ur(p)} for p ≥ ξ1, if c is sufficiently small. Turning
to p < ξ1, we note that URS(p) > max {Uℓ(p), Ur(p)} for p ∈ [p∗, ξ1]: URS(p) > Uℓ(p) is
proven in the same way as UR(p) > Uℓ(p) in the case where p
∗ ≤ η; and URS(p) > Ur(p)
follows from URS(p) > UR(p) > Ur(p) (which holds since URS(ξ1) = US(ξ1) > UR(ξ1) by
Lemma 2). Hence the receiver’s value exceeds max {Uℓ(p), Ur(p)} also for p ∈ [p∗, ξ1] if
c is sufficiently small. This completes the verification of the receiver’s incentives in the
equilibrium specified by Proposition 2 when p∗ > η.
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B.3.5 Equilibrium Verification in Proposition 3
Suppose Condition C2 fails. As for Proposition 2, Lemmas 15 and 16 imply that the
sender’s strategy is a best response in each case. The optimality of the receiver’s strategy
outside the waiting region is straightforward, because the sender passes for all p /∈ (p∗, p
∗).
For the following, recall from Section B.2.3 that p∗ = πℓL in Proposition 3.
Receiver optimality when p ∈ (p∗, p
∗) and p∗ ≤ η: First, consider p > πLR. If c is
sufficiently small, then p∗ < p, and thus UR(p) > Ur(p) for all p < p
∗ (see Lemma 5).
Moreover, by Lemma 7, φℓR < πℓR because Condition C2 does not hold. Since VR(p) < 0
for p < πℓR we have πLR ≥ πℓR > φℓR. This implies that UR(p) > Uℓ(p) for p > πLR.
(This follows from convexity of UR(p) since UR(φℓR) = Uℓ(φℓR) and UR(p
∗) > Uℓ(p
∗).)
Hence we have U(p) = UR(p) ≥ max{Ur(p), Uℓ(p)} for all p ∈ [πLR, p
∗].
For p ∈ [p∗, πLR], note that p∗ = πℓL > φℓL, where the inequality follows from Lemma
8 if Condition C2 is violated. Condition (35) and convexity of UL(p) then imply that
UL(p) > Uℓ(p) for all p > p∗ = πℓL. To show that UL(p) > Ur(p) for p ∈ [p∗, πLR] we
show that for c sufficiently small, πLR < pˆ so that Ur(p) < Uℓ(p). To see this note that
for p∗ = πℓL, Lemma 10.b implies that πLR → 0 as c → 0 which implies πLR < pˆ for c
sufficiently small. Hence we have UL(p) > max{Ur(p), Uℓ(p)} for all p ∈ [p∗, πLR]. This
completes the proof that waiting is a best response of the receiver for all p ∈ (p∗, p
∗).
Receiver optimality when p ∈ (p∗, p
∗) and p∗ > η: For the case p∗ ≤ η, we showed
that U(p) = UR(p) ≥ max{Ur(p), Uℓ(p)} for all p ∈ [πLR, p
∗]. The proof works virtually
unchanged for the current case and shows that U(p) = UR(p) ≥ max{Ur(p), Uℓ(p)} for all
p ∈ [φℓR, p
∗], and hence for all p ∈ [πLR, p
∗]. Moreover by Lemma 6.b, for c sufficiently
low, URS(ξ1) = US(ξ1) ≥ max {Uℓ(ξ1), Ur(ξ1)}. Noting that URS(p) > UR(p) for all p ≤ ξ1,
this implies that URS(p) > Ur(p) for all p ≤ ξ1. Moreover, since Condition C2 is violated,
we have πLR > πℓR > φℓR which implies that URS(p) > Uℓ(p) for all p ∈ [πLR, ξ1]. This
shows that U(p) = UR(p) ≥ max{Ur(p), Uℓ(p)} for all p ∈ [πLR, ξ1].
Next consider the beliefs where the sender uses an L-drifting strategy. For p ∈ [ξ1, πLR],
we have to show ULS(p) > max{Ur(p), Uℓ(p)}. Note that
ULS(p)− UR(p) = C+(p; p
∗)− C−(p; ξ1)−
p∗ − p
p∗ − ξ1
CS(ξ1) = VLS(p)− VR(p).
Since VLS(p) > VR(p) for p ∈ [ξ1, πLR], we therefore have ULS(p) > UR(p) > max{Ur(p), Uℓ(p)}
for p ∈ [ξ1, πLR]. We have already shown that UR(p) > max{Ur(p), Uℓ(p)} for p ∈
(φℓR, p
∗) and since φℓR < ξ1 for c sufficiently small we therefore have U(p) = ULS(p) >
max{Ur(p), Uℓ(p)} for p ∈ [ξ1, πLR].
It remains to consider p ∈ [p∗, πLR]. As in the case where p
∗ ≤ η, we have UL(p) >
Uℓ(p) for p ∈ [p∗, πLR]. Again we show that UL(p) > Ur(p) for p ∈ [p∗, πLR] if c is
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sufficiently small. To show this, note that πLR < πLR since VRS(p) > VR(p) for all
p < ξ1. Hence πLR → 0 since πLR → 0 by Lemma 10.b. This completes the proof that
U(p) = UL(p) > max{Ur(p), Uℓ(p)} for p ∈ [p∗, πLR].
B.4 Uniqueness
We complete the proofs of Propositions 2 and 3 by proving that the given strategy profiles
are the unique SMPE in each case.
B.4.1 Lower Bound of p∗
We begin with two useful observations, formally reported in the following lemma.
Lemma 19. Fix p∗ ∈ (pˆ, p). In any SMPE, p∗ ≥ max{φℓL, πℓL}. In addition, if p∗ >
max{φℓL, πℓL}, then V (p∗) > 0 and Uℓ(p∗) = U(p∗).
In the proof, the crucial step is to show that for any strategy profile, the sender’s payoff
is negative if p < πℓL, and the receiver’s payoff is less than Uℓ(p) if p < φℓL. To show this,
we consider a hypothetical strategy in which the sender can choose α1 = α2 = 1, violating
the constraint α1 + α2 ≤ 1. The value of this strategy, which is an upper bound for any
feasible strategy, is negative for the sender if p < πℓL, and below Uℓ(p) for the receiver if
p < φℓL. Therefore, the lower bound of the waiting region must be greater than or equal
to max{φℓL, πℓL}.
To understand the second result of Lemma 19, notice first that if V (p∗) = 0, then
the optimal jump-target for p < p∗ is p
∗. This implies that for p∗ > max{φℓL, πℓL}, the
receiver would prefer to wait when p ∈ (φℓL, p
∗), in contrast to the conjectured equilibrium.
Therefore p∗ > max{φℓL, πℓL} requires V (p∗) > 0. If V (p∗) > 0, however, the sender will
target p∗ for beliefs in the stopping region close to p∗. Uℓ(p∗) = U(p∗) is needed to
guarantee that such jumps do not give the receiver an incentive to wait.
Lemma 19 implies that there are only two cases to consider: (i) p∗ = max{φℓL, πℓL};
or (ii) p∗ > max{φℓL, πℓL} and p∗ is determined by the receiver’s incentives (i.e., Uℓ(p∗) =
U(p∗)). Propositions 2 and 3 correspond to each of these two cases.
B.4.2 Proof of Uniqueness in Proposition 2
In Proposition 2, Condition C2 holds, that is, v > Ur(p
∗) − Uℓ(p
∗). In this case, by
Lemma 8, φℓL > πℓL ⇔ max {φℓL, πℓL} = φℓL: the receiver is less willing to continue and,
therefore, stops at a higher belief than the sender. In addition, we have the following
important observation:
Lemma 20. If v > Ur(p
∗)−Uℓ(p
∗) and c is sufficiently small, then p∗ > φℓL = max {φℓL, πℓL}
in any SMPE.
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The crucial step in the proof is to show that for c sufficiently small, VRS(p∗; qR) > 0
if p∗ = φℓL. This implies that the sender uses the R-drifting strategy close to p∗ which
yields negative utility for the receiver for p ∈ [φℓL, φℓR). Hence, p∗ = φℓL implies that the
receiver’s incentives are violated. Therefore, we must have p∗ > φℓL in equilibrium.
Since p∗ > φℓL = max {φℓL, πℓL} by Lemma 20, Lemma 19 requires that the receiver’s
value at p∗ is equal to Uℓ(p∗). To determine the receiver’s value at p∗, note that Lemma
15 implies that the sender either uses R-drifting experiments at p∗ (Parts (b), (d) or (f)
of the lemma) or she uses the the stationary strategy (Part (e) of the lemma). For c→ 0
we have US(p), URS(p; qR)→ ((p
∗− p)/p∗)Uℓ(0) + (p/p
∗)Ur(p
∗). Since the receiver’s value
at p∗ must be equal to Uℓ(p∗), we must therefore have p∗ → 0 for c→ 0. Therefore, for c
sufficiently small Lemma 15.(e) never applies, and the sender uses R-drifting experiments
at p∗. Hence, the receiver’s indifference condition implies p∗ = φℓR. It then follows from
Lemma 15 that the strategy profile stated in Proposition 2 is the only one that can arise
in equilibrium, establishing uniqueness of the equilibrium in Proposition 2.
B.4.3 Proof of Uniqueness in Proposition 3
In Proposition 3, v ≤ Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗), and thus πℓL = max {φℓL, πℓL}. Using Lemma 19,
we show that p∗ = πℓL if Condition C2 fails:
Lemma 21. If v ≤ Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗), then p∗ = πℓL in any SMPE.
With p∗ = πℓL, uniqueness of the equilibrium in Proposition 3 then follows immediately
from the characterization of the sender’s best response in Lemma 15.
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C Remaining Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. Recall that v(p) is defined as follows:
v(p) := max
(αi,qi)i
∑
qi 6=p
αiv(p; qi) subject to
∑
i∈N
αi ≤ 1,
where
v(p; qi) := λ
p(1− p)
|qi − p|
(V (qi)− V (p))− sgn(qi − p)λp(1− p)V
′(p).
As explained in Section 5.1, the first result of Proposition 1 (namely that for each p ∈
(0, 1), the sender uses at most two experiments, (α1, q1) and (α2, q2), where 0 ≤ q2 < p <
q1 ≤ p
∗) directly follows from the fact that both
∑
qi 6=p
αiv(p; qi) and
∑
i∈N αi ≤ 1 are
linear in αi.
For the second result, write v(p) as
v(p) = max
(α1,q1),(α2,q2)
λp(1− p)
[
α1
V (q1)− V (p)
q1 − p
+ α2
V (q2)− V (p)
p− q1
− (α1 − α2)V
′(p)
]
,
where α1 + α2 ≤ 1, and assume that V (·) is non-negative, increasing and convex over
(p∗, p
∗] and V (p∗)/p∗ < V
′(p∗). Clearly, the optimal q1 maximizes (V (q1)−V (p))/(q1−p),
while the optimal q2 maximizes (V (q2)− V (p))/(p− q1).
Suppose that p ∈ (p∗, p
∗). The optimality of q1 = p
∗ follows immediately from con-
vexity of V (·). A similar argument shows that the optimal q2 is either 0 or p∗. In order
to show that 0 is optimal, notice that V ′(p∗) > V (p∗)/p∗ implies that
V (p)− V (p∗)
p− p∗
=
∫ p
p∗
V ′(x)dx
p− p∗
≥
∫ p
p∗
V ′(p∗)dx
p− p∗
= V ′(p∗) >
V (p∗)
p∗
,
which is equivalent to
V (p)
p
>
V (p∗)
p∗
⇔
V (p)− V (p∗)
p− p∗
>
V (p)
p
=
V (p)− V (0)
p
⇔
V (p∗)− V (p)
p− p∗
<
V (0)− V (p)
p− 0
.
Now suppose that p < p∗. Again, the optimality of q1 = p∗ or q1 = p
∗ follows from
convexity of V (·) over (p∗, p
∗]. The optimality of q2 = 0 simply comes from the fact that
V (p) = 0 for all p < p∗.
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C.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof of Lemma 1. Substituting V+(p) = VS(p) in (10) we obtain V
′
+(p), and differentiat-
ing (6) we obtain V ′S(p):
V ′+(p) =
v
p∗
+
2p− p∗
p∗p(1− p)
c
λ
and V ′S(p) =
v
p∗
+
1− p∗
(1− p)2
2c
λp∗
.
Straightforward algebra yields
V ′+(p) S V ′S(p) ⇐⇒ 3pp∗ − p∗ − 2p2 S 0.
The quadratic expression 3pp∗ − p∗ − 2p2 is negative for all p ∈ [0, p∗] if p∗ < 8/9.
Hence, if p∗ < 8/9, V ′+(p) < V
′
S(p) for all p ∈ (0, p
∗). This proves part (a).
If p∗ ≥ 8/9, the quadratic expression 3pp∗ − p∗ − 2p2 has the real roots ξ1(p
∗) and
ξ2(p
∗), which are distinct if p∗ > 8/9. Hence V ′+(q) = V
′
S(p) if p ∈ {ξ1(p
∗), ξ2(p
∗)}.
Since the quadratic expression is concave in p, V ′+(q) > V
′
S(p) if p ∈ (ξ1(p
∗), ξ2(p
∗)), and
V ′+(q) < V
′
S(p) if p /∈ [ξ1(p
∗), ξ2(p
∗)]. This proves part (b).
C.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 2. We have already argued that for p∗ < 8/9 VS(p) < VR(p) for all
p ∈ (0, p∗). Now suppose that p∗ ≥ 8/9, so that ξ1(p
∗) and ξ2(p
∗) are well defined.
Our notation for VS(p) does not explicitly note the dependence on p
∗. In this proof,
to avoid confusion, we explicitly note this dependence and write VS(p; p
∗). The equation
defining η is therefore given by
VS(ξ1(η); η) = V+(ξ1(η); η, v),
where the right-hand side makes explicit the dependence of VR(p) on p
∗ = η. We have
already argued in the text before the statement of the lemma that that VS(p; p
∗) <
V+(p; p
∗, v) for all p ∈ (0, p∗) if and only if VS(ξ1(p
∗); p∗) < V+(ξ1(p
∗); p∗, v). We have
to show that this is equivalent to p∗ < η. To do so we show that VS(ξ1(p
∗); p∗) =
V+(ξ1(p
∗); p∗, v) implies that VS intersects V+ from below (as functions of p
∗).
If VS(ξ1(p
∗); p∗) = V+(ξ1(p
∗); p∗, v), then Lemma 1.(b) implies that
∂VS(ξ1(p
∗); p∗)
∂p
−
∂V+(ξ1(p
∗); p∗, v)
∂p
= 0.
This implies
d (VS(ξ1(p
∗); p∗)− V+(ξ1(p
∗); p∗, v))
dp∗
=
∂ (VS(ξ1(p
∗); p∗)− V+(ξ1(p
∗); p∗, v))
∂p∗
,
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where the partial derivative on the RHS is the derivative with respect to the second
argument of VS and V+, respectively. We show that this derivative is positive:
∂ (VS(ξ1(p
∗); p∗)− V+(ξ1(p
∗); p∗, v))
∂p∗
=
∂
∂p∗
((
ξ1(p
∗) log
(
p∗
1− p∗
1− ξ1(p
∗)
ξ1(p∗)
)
+ 1−
ξ1(p
∗)
p∗
)
c
λ
−
2c(p∗ − ξ1(p
∗))
λp∗(1− ξ1(p∗))
)
=
2p∗ − 1− ξ1(p
∗)
(p∗)2 (1− p∗) (1− ξ1(p∗))
ξ1(p
∗)
c
λ
>
5
4
p∗ − 1
(p∗)2 (1− p∗) (1− ξ1(p∗))
ξ1(p
∗)
c
λ
> 0,
where the first inequality holds since ξ1(p
∗) ≤ 3p∗/4, and the second since p∗ ≥ 8/9. This
completes the proof.
C.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof of Lemma 3. From (10) we get
V ′+(p) =
V+(p)
p
+
c
λp(1− p)
,
and from (20) we get
V ′−(p) =
v − V−(p)
p∗ − p
−
c
λp(1− p)
.
Given V+(p) = V−(p), the difference is equal to
V ′+(p)− V
′
−(p) =
p∗
p (p∗ − p)
V−(p) +
2c
λp(1− p)
−
v
p∗ − p
=
p∗
p(p∗ − p)
(V−(p)− VS(p)) .
Since p∗/(p(p∗ − p)) is positive for all p < p∗, this proves the Lemma.
C.5 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof of Lemma 4. By construction, VS(ξ1) = V+(ξ1) = VRS(ξ1) and V
′
S(ξ1) = V
′
+(ξ1) =
V ′RS(ξ1). In addition, VLS(ξ1) = VRS(ξ1). Then, by Lemma 3, V
′
LS(ξ1) = V
′
RS(ξ1) = V
′
S(ξ1).
For p 6= ξ1, consider VRS(p) first. We will show that V
′′
RS(ξ1) > V
′′
S (ξ1). Since V
′
RS(ξ1) =
V ′S(ξ1) by Lemma 4.(a), this implies that VRS(p) > VS(p) for p ∈ (ξ1 − ε, ξ1) for some
ε > 0. Lemma 1 then implies that VRS(p) > VS(p) for all p ∈ [0, ξ1).
To complete the proof it remains to show V ′′RS(ξ1) > V
′′
S (ξ1). Direct calculation yields
V ′′RS(ξ1) > V
′′
S (ξ1)⇔ −
1
(1− ξ1)2ξ1
> −
4(1− p∗)
(1 − ξ1)3p∗
⇔ ξ1 <
p∗
4− 3p∗
.
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Since ξ1 ≤ 3p
∗/4 and p∗ > 8/9, the last inequality is satisfied.
Next consider VLS(p). The proof works virtually identically except that we have:
V ′′LS(ξ1) > V
′′
S (ξ1)⇔
p∗ − 2pp∗ + p
(ξ1)2(p∗ − ξ1)
> −
4(1− p∗)
(1− ξ1)p∗
⇔ (5p∗ − 4)(ξ1)
3 + (3− 6p∗)p∗(ξ1)
2 + 3(p∗)2ξ1 − (p
∗)2 < 0.
Since ξ1 ≤ 3p
∗/4 and p∗ > 8/9, the last inequality is satisfied. This implies that VLS(p) >
VS(p) for p ∈ (ξ1, ξ1+ε) for some ξ1 > 0. Part (a) implies that Lemma 1 can also be applied
to V−(p). Therefore, if VLS(p) and VS(p) intersect at p ∈ (ξ1, ξ2), then VLS(p) crosses VS(p)
from below. Since VLS(p) > VS(p) for p ∈ (ξ1, ξ1 + ε), this implies VLS(p) > VS(p) for all
p ∈ (ξ1, ξ2).
C.6 Proof of Lemma 5
Proof of Lemma 5. Substituting UR(p
∗) = Ur(p
∗) in (11), we get
U ′R(p
∗) = −
1
p∗
(
uLℓ − p
∗uRr − (1− p
∗)uLr
)
+
c
λp∗(1− p∗)
= U ′r(p
∗)−
uLℓ − u
L
r
p∗
+
c
λp∗(1− p∗)
.
Simple algebra then shows that U ′R(p
∗) S U ′r(p∗) is equivalent to p∗ S p.
C.7 Proof of Lemma 6
Proof of Lemma 6. (a) If p∗ ≤ η, φℓR is defined by Uℓ(φℓR) = UR(φℓR). Since p
∗ > pˆ,
UR(p
∗) = Ur(p
∗) > Uℓ(p
∗), and from (14) we have limp→0UR(p) = Uℓ(0)− c/λ. Therefore
an intersection φℓR exists and since Uℓ(p) is linear and UR(p) is convex, the intersection is
unique. Finally, if p∗ ≤ p, U ′R(p
∗) ≤ U ′r(p
∗) and, since Ur(p) is linear and UR(p) is convex,
UR(p) > Ur(p) for all p < p
∗. In particular this implies that Uℓ(φℓR) = UR(φℓR) > Ur(φℓR)
which shows that φℓR < pˆ.
(b) We first show that US(ξ1) > max {Uℓ(ξ1), Ur(ξ1)} for c sufficiently small. This
follows directly from US(ξ1) →
p∗−ξ1
p∗
uLℓ +
ξ1
p∗
Ur(p
∗) > max {Uℓ(ξ1), Ur(ξ1)}, where the
strict inequality follows from p∗ > pˆ and the fact that max {Uℓ(ξ1), Ur(ξ1)} is piecewise
linear and V -shaped.
Hence, URS(ξ1) = US(ξ1) > max {Uℓ(ξ1), Ur(ξ1)} for c sufficiently small. From (19) we
have limp→0URS(p) = Uℓ(0)− c/λ. Therefore an intersection φℓR ∈ (0, ξ1) exists and since
Uℓ(p) is linear and by (12), UR(p) is convex, the intersection is unique. Finally, URS(p) >
UR(p) for all p < ξ1 and therefore Uℓ(φℓR) = URS(φℓR) > UR(φℓR) > Ur(φℓR), where we
have used that UR(p) > Ur(p) for all p < p
∗ as in the case p∗ ≤ η. Uℓ(φℓR) > Ur(φℓR)
shows that φℓR < pˆ.
For both (a) and (b), the convergence φℓR → 0 follows from UR(p), URS(p)→ ((p
∗ − p)/p∗)uLℓ +
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(p/p∗) Ur(p
∗) > Uℓ(p) for all p > 0.
C.8 Proof of Lemma 7
Proof of Lemma 7. In this proof we use the simplified notation URS(p; qR) that was in-
troduced in section B.1.5. With this notation (29) and (30) can be written as follows:
Uℓ(φℓR) = URS(φℓR, qR) and 0 = VRS(πℓR, qR).
Substituting Uℓ(φℓR) and URS(φℓR, qR) in the first condition we obtain
φℓRu
R
ℓ + (1− φℓR)u
L
ℓ =
p∗ − φℓR
p∗
uLℓ +
φℓR
p∗
Ur(p
∗)− C+(φℓR; qR)−
φℓR
qR
CS(qR),
which reduces to
1
p∗
(Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗)) =
1
φℓR
C+(φℓR; qR) +
1
qR
CS(qR).
Similarly, from the second condition we obtain
1
p∗
v =
1
πℓR
C+(πℓR; qR) +
1
qR
CS(qR).
This implies that
v > Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗) ⇔
1
πℓR
C+(πℓR; qR) >
1
φℓR
C+(φℓR; qR)
⇔ πℓR < φℓR,
where the last equivalence is due to the fact that
d
dp
(
1
p
C+(p; qR)
)
= −
1
p2
C+(p; qR) +
1
p
C ′+(p; qR)
=−
1
p2
(
p log
(
qR
1− qR
1− p
p
)
+ 1−
p
qR
− p
(
log
(
qR
1− qR
1− p
p
)
−
1
1− p
−
1
qR
))
c
λ
=−
1
p2(1− p)
c
λ
< 0.
C.9 Proof of Lemma 8
Proof of Lemma 8. Equation (31) is equivalent to
v =
p∗ − πℓL
πℓL(1− πℓL)
c
λ
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and (34) is equivalent to
Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗) =
p∗ − φℓL
φℓL(1− φℓL)
c
λ
.
The desired result follows from the fact that (d/dp) ((p∗ − p)/(p(1− p))) < 0.
C.10 Proof of Lemma 9
Proof of Lemma 9. We first show that
lim
c→0
VL(p) =
p
p∗
v = lim
c→0
VR(p).
For VL(p) we derive a lower bound that converges to pv/p
∗. Since V ′L(πℓL) = 0 and VL(p) is
convex, we have VL(p) > 0 for p > πℓL. Therefore VL(p) > V−(p; q, 0) for any q ∈ (πℓL, p).
From (21) and (22), we obtain
lim
c→0
V−(p; q, 0) =
p− q
p∗ − q
v.
Since πℓL → 0 we have
lim
c→0
VL(p) ≥ lim
q→0
lim
c→0
V−(p; q, 0) =
p
p∗
v.
Moreover, since C−(p; πℓL) > 0, VL(p) < pv/p∗ and therefore limc→0 VL(p) = pv/p∗. For
VR(p) the limit follows from limc→0C+(p; p
∗) = 0.
To show that VL(p) < VR(p) for c sufficiently small, we compare the derivatives with
respect to c of both functions in a neighborhood of c = 0. For VR(p), we have
dVR(p)
dc
= −
∂C+(p; p
∗)
∂c
= −
(
p log
(
p∗
1− p∗
1− p
p
)
+
p∗ − p
p∗
)
< 0.
This is equal to zero for p = 0 and p = p∗ and continuous in p. Therefore, ∂VR(p)/∂c is
uniformly bounded in (p, c) on [0, p∗]× R+.
For VL(p) we have
dVL(p)
dc
=
∂VL(p)
∂πℓL
∂πℓL
∂c
+
∂VL(p)
∂c
.
The first term on the RHS is zero since
∂VL(p)
∂πℓL
=
(p∗ − p) [c(p∗ − πℓL)− (1− πℓL)πℓLvλ]
(1− πℓL)πℓL(p∗ − πℓL)2λ
= 0.
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where the term in the square brackets is zero from (31). The second term on the RHS is
∂VL(p)
∂c
= −
C−(p; πℓL)
c
=
p∗ − p
p∗(1− p∗)
(
p∗ log
1− πℓL
1− p
+ (1− p∗) log
πℓL
p
− log
p∗ − πℓL
p∗ − p
)
1
λ
.
Taking the limit and using πℓL → 0, we get
lim
c→0
dVL(p)
dc
= lim
c→0
∂VL(p)
∂c
= −∞.
for all p ∈ (0, p∗). This shows that for any p ∈ (0, p∗) there exists c(p) > 0 such that
VL(p) < VR(p) for c ∈ (0, c(p)).
C.11 Proof of Lemma 10
Proof of Lemma 10. (a) For c sufficiently small, Lemma 9 implies that VL(p) < VR(p)
for all p ∈ [ξ1, p
∗), so that any intersection must be at p < ξ1. Therefore, by Lemma 2,
VL(p) = VR(p) > VS(p) at any intersection. Then, by the Crossing Lemma 3, VR(p) can
intersect VL(p) only from below which implies that there is at most one intersection of
VR(p) and VL(p).
If p∗ = πℓR, then an intersection exists at πLR = p∗ since VR(p∗) = 0 = VL(p∗). If
p∗ < πℓR, then VR(p∗) < 0 = VL(p∗) and since VL(ξ1) < VR(ξ1) for c sufficiently small, the
intermediate value theorem implies that there exists an intersection of VR(p) and VL(p)
in (p∗, p
∗). In both cases the intersection is unique by the same argument as above. The
remaining claim of the Lemma holds since VR(p) crosses VL(p) from below.
If p∗ > πℓR, then VR(p∗) > 0 = VL(p∗) so that the number of intersections must be
even which implies that there is no intersection and VL(p) < VR(p) for all p ∈ (p∗, p
∗).
(b) From Lemma 9 if follows directly that πLR → 0 as c → 0 if p∗ = πℓL (this means
if we adjust p∗ to maintain p∗ = πℓL as c→ 0).
C.12 Proof of Lemma 11
Proof of Lemma 11. By Lemma 2, VLS(ξ1) = VS(ξ1) > VR(ξ1) if p
∗ > η. From (22), (13)
and (27), we obtain
C ′−(p; q) = −
C−(p; q)
p∗ − p
−
p∗ − p
p∗(1− p∗)
(
p∗
1− p
−
1− p∗
p
−
1
p∗ − p
)
c
λ
and
lim
p→p∗
V ′LS(p
∗) = − lim
p→p∗
C ′−(p; q) =∞.
Therefore, VLS(p) < VR(p) for p ∈ (p
∗ − ε, p∗) for some ε > 0. This shows that there is at
least one intersection of VLS(p) and VR(p) in the interval (ξ1, p
∗).
Next we show that the intersection is unique. We have VLS(ξ1) = VS(ξ1) and VLS(p
∗) =
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VS(p
∗). By the Crossing Lemma 3, the conditions characterizing intersections of VS and
V+ in Lemma 1 also apply to V−. These crossing conditions imply VLS(p) > VS(p) for
all p ∈ (ξ1, p
∗). This implies that we can apply the Crossing Lemma 3 to intersections of
VLS and VR. Since VLS(p) > VS(p), the Crossing Lemma 3 implies that V
′
LS(p) < V
′
R(p)
at any intersection p ∈ (ξ1, p
∗). Therefore there is a unique intersection, and this defines
the cutoff πLR. Clearly, for p ∈ [ξ1, πLR), VLS(p) > VR(p), and for p ∈ (πLR, p
∗), VLS(p) <
VR(p).
C.13 Proof of Lemma 12
Proof of Lemma 12. We have VRS(ξ1) = VS(ξ1) and from (6) and (18) we have VRS(0) >
VS(0). Lemma 1 implies that if VRS(p) = VS(p) for p < ξ then V
′
RS(p) < V
′
S(p). Therefore,
there cannot be any intersection for p < ξ and we have VRS(p) > VS(p) for p < ξ1.
Since VRS(p) > VS(p) for all p < ξ1, the Crossing Lemma 3 implies that there can
be at most one intersection of VRS(p) and VL(p) for p ∈ (p∗, ξ1) and VL(p) must cross
VRS(p) from above. If p∗ ≥ πℓR, then VL(p∗) = 0 ≤ VRS(p∗), hence there cannot be any
intersection which implies that VL(p) < VRS(p) for all p ∈ (p∗, ξ1). Next suppose that
p∗ < πℓR. This implies that VRS(p∗) < 0 = VL(p∗), therefore by the intermediate value
theorem, an intersection exists if VL(ξ1) < VS(ξ1), and we have already shown that the
intersection is unique. Clearly, VL(p) > VRS(p) if p ∈ [p∗, πLR) and VL(p) < VRS(p) if
p ∈ (πLR, ξ1).
C.14 Proof of Lemma 13
Proof of Lemma 13. Let p ∈ (p∗, p
∗). Strict convexity of V (p) on (p∗, p
∗) and p∗V
′(p∗+) ≥
V (p∗) imply that it suffices to consider jumps to zero and p
∗ in (HJB). If p∗V
′(p∗+) >
V (p∗), then 0 or p
∗ is the unique optimal jump target. Hence (HJB) simplifies to (HJB-S)
which can be written as
c
λp(1− p)
= −
V (p)
p
+ V ′(p) + max
α
[
V (p)
p
+
v − V (p)
p∗ − p
− 2V ′(p)
]
α.
For part (a) we substitute V ′(p) using (20) in the coefficient of α and rearrange as follows:
V (p)
p
+
v − V (p)
p∗ − p
− 2V ′(p) =
2c
λp(1− p)
+
V (p)
p
−
v − V (p)
p∗ − p
=
2c
λp(1− p)
−
v
p∗ − p
+
V (p)
p∗ − p
+
V (p)
p
=
p∗
p(p∗ − p)
V (p)−
λp(1− p)v − 2c(p∗ − p)
λp(1− p)(p∗ − p)
=
p∗
p(p∗ − p)
(V (p)− VS(p)) .
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Hence α = 1 is a maximizer in (HJB-S) if V (p) ≥ VS(p) and (HJB-S) holds if
c
λp(1− p)
=
v − V (p)
p∗ − p
− V ′(p),
which is equivalent to (20). If V (p) > VS(p), α = 1 is the unique maximizer.
For part (b), we substitute V ′(p) from (10) instead to obtain
V (p)
p
+
v − V (p)
p∗ − p
− 2V ′(p) =
v − V (p)
p∗ − p
−
V (p)
p
−
2c
λp(1− p)
= −
p∗
p(p∗ − p)
(V (p)− VS(p))
Hence α = 0 is a maximizer in the HJB equation if V (p) ≥ VS(p) and (HJB-S) holds if
c
λp(1− p)
= −
V (p)
p
+ V ′(p),
which is equivalent to (10). If V (p) > VS(p), α = 0 is the unique maximizer.
C.15 Proof of Lemma 14
Proof of Lemma 14. By Lemma 13, V (p) satisfies (HJB) for all points p ∈ (p∗, p
∗) where
it is differentiable. To show that it is a viscosity solution, we have to show that for all
points p′ ∈ (p∗, p
∗) where V (p) is not differentiable,
max
α∈[0,1]
λp′(1− p′)
[
α
w − V (p′)
p∗ − p′
− (1− α)
V (p′)
p′
− (2α− 1) z
]
≤ c
for all z ∈ [V ′(p′−), V
′(p′+)]. We have simplified the condition for a viscosity solution using
the fact that V (p) ≥ 0, and V (p) satisfies (20) below the kink and (10) above the kink,
the kink is convex (i.e., V ′(p′−) < V
′(p′+)), and that V (p) is strictly convex and satisfies
p∗V
′(p∗+) ≥ V (p∗+).
Since the term in the square bracket is linear in α, it suffices to check this condition
for α ∈ {0, 1}. For α = 1 we have − (2α− 1) z < − (2α− 1)V ′(p′+) and for α = 0 we
have − (2α− 1) z < − (2α− 1) V ′(p′−). Hence it is sufficient to check
λp′(1− p′)max
{
w − V (p′)
p∗ − p′
− V ′(p′+),−
V (p′)
p′
+ V ′(p′−)
}
≤ c.
Since V (p) is continuous and satisfies (20) for p′′ ∈ (p′ − ε, p′) and satisfies (10) for
p′′ ∈ (p′, p′ + ε), the last condition holds with equality. Therefore, V (p) is a viscosity
solution of (HJB). Uniqueness is shown as in the proof of Lemma 13.
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C.16 Proof of Lemma 15
Proof of Lemma 15. For the proof of this Lemma, we verify for each case (a)–(f) that
the stated value functions verify the conditions of Lemmas 13 and 14. This implies that
the candidate value function is a viscosity solution of (HJB). The value function must
necessarily be a viscosity solution of (HJB) (see, e.g., Theorem 10.8 in Oksendal and
Sulem, 2009). While we are not aware of a statement of sufficiency that covers precisely
our model, the arguments in Soner (1986) can be easily extended to show uniqueness of
the viscosity solution to (HJB). This proves that the candidate value function V (p) is
the value function of the sender’s problem in the waiting region. Uniqueness of the best
response follows from Lemmas 13 and 14. At the end of the proof we also address the
existence issue for part (e).
We now verify the conditions of Lemmas 13 and 14. Outside the waiting region the
sender’s value function satisfies V (p) = 0 for p < p∗ and V (p) = v for p > p
∗. The other
properties are verified one by one:
V (p) > 0. Note first that for c sufficiently small, πℓR < ξ1, which we use in some of the
cases.
(a) Since p∗ ≥ πℓL, we have VL(p) > 0 for p ∈ (p∗, p
∗] and therefore V (p) > 0.
(b) Since p∗ ≥ πℓR, we have VR(p) > 0 for p ∈ (p∗, p
∗] and therefore V (p) > 0.
(c) The argument for case (a) implies that V (p) > 0 for p ∈ (p∗, ξ1), and the argument
for case (b) implies that V (p) > 0 for p ∈ (ξ1, p
∗] since πℓR < ξ1. Finally, for c
sufficiently small, VS(ξ1) > 0.
(d) Since p∗ ≥ πℓR, we have VRS(p) > 0 for p ∈ (p∗, ξ1], and therefore V (p) > 0 for
p ∈ (p∗, ξ1]. The argument for case (b) implies that V (p) > 0 for p ∈ (ξ1, p
∗] since
πℓR < ξ1. Finally, for c sufficiently small, VS(ξ1) > 0.
(e) Since p∗ ≥ ξ1 > πℓR, as in (b), we have VR(p) > 0 for p ∈ (p∗, p
∗] and therefore
V (p) ≥ 0. For c sufficiently small VS(ξ1) > 0.
(f) Since p∗πSR > ξ1 > πℓR, as in (b) we have VR(p) > 0 for p ∈ (p∗, p
∗] and therefore
V (p) ≥ 0.
Continuity. We only need to verify continuity at the cutoffs since elsewhere the candi-
date value functions are solutions to the ODEs (10) and (20):
• at p∗ if the waiting region is [p∗, p
∗). By admissibility, this rules out cases (a) and
(c).
(e) Since VLS(p∗) = VS(p∗) is used as the boundary condition for VLS(p), the
candidate value function is continuous at p∗.
(b,d,f) In all other cases VR(p) is continuous at p∗.
• at ξ1: Since VRS(ξ1) = VLS(ξ1) = VS(ξ1) from the boundary condition used to define
VLS and VRS, the candidate value functions in (c)–(d) are continuous at ξ1.
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• All other cutoffs (πLR, πLR, πLR) are given by indifference conditions between the
value functions in the adjacent regions of beliefs. Therefore, the candidate value
function is continuous at theses cutoffs.
V (p) ≥ VS(p).
(a,b) By Lemma 2, VR(p) ≥ VS(p) for all p < p
∗ since p∗ ≤ η. The inequality is strict if
p∗ < η or p∗ = η and p 6= η. In (a), when V (p) = VL(p) we have VL(p) ≥ VR(p) so
that VL(p) ≥ VS(p) (or VL(p) > VS(p)) as well.
(c,d) By Lemma 12, V (p) ≥ VRS(p) for p ∈ (p∗, ξ1), and by Lemma 4.(b) VRS(p) > VS(p)
for p ∈ (p∗, ξ1). Hence V (p) > VS(p) for p ∈ (p∗, ξ1). By Lemma 2, VR(p) > VS(p) for
p ∈ [ξ2, p
∗) and by Lemma 4.(b) VLS(p) > VS(p) for p ∈ (ξ1, ξ2). Hence V (p) > VS(p)
for p ∈ (ξ1, p
∗).
(e) By Lemma 2, VR(p) > VS(p) for p ∈ [ξ2, p
∗). Since p∗ < πRS in case (e), Lemma 2
implies that p∗ ∈ (ξ1, ξ2). The proof of Lemma 4.(b) can be extended to show that
VLS(p) > VS(p) for p ∈ (ξ1, ξ2) when VLS(p) = V−(p; p∗, VS(p∗)) for p∗ ∈ (ξ1, ξ2).
Hence V (p) > VS(p) for p ∈ (p∗, p
∗).
(f) Since p∗ ≥ πRS , Lemma 2 implies that VR(p) > VS(p) for all p ∈ (p
∗, p∗).
Strict convexity. The candidate value functions are defined piece-wise using the func-
tions VR, VRS, VL, and VLS, which are all strictly convex (see (12) and (24), respectively).
Lemma 4 implies that V ′LS(ξ1) = V
′
RS(ξ1) in (c) and (d). Therefore, it only remains to
verify that at the remaining cutoffs the value function has convex kinks. To do this we
employ the Crossing Lemma 3. Note that at any cutoff x ∈ {πLR, πLR, πLR}, V (p) satis-
fies (10) for p ∈ (x, x+ ε), and (20) for p ∈ (x− ε, x) for some ε > 0. Since V (p) ≥ VS(p)
(see above), the Crossing Lemma 3 imples that V ′(x−) ≤ V
′(x+)—that is V (p) is either
continuously differentiable at x or has a convex kink. Therefore V (p) is strictly convex.
p∗V
′(p∗+) ≥ V (p∗).
(a,c) In these two cases we have V (p∗+) = V (p∗) = 0 and by (33), V
′(p∗+) ≥ 0.
(b,d,f) We define
V˜ (p) =


V (p) if p > p∗,
VR(p) if p ≤ p∗ in cases (b) and (f),
VRS(p) if p ≤ p∗ in case (d).
Since VR(p) is strictly convex on [0, p
∗] and VRS(p) strictly convex on [0, ξ1], V˜ (p)
is a strictly convex function on [0, p∗]. Moreover limp→0 V˜ (p) = limp→0 VR(p) =
limp→0 VRS(p) = −c/λ < 0. This implies that p∗V˜
′(p∗) > V˜ (p∗) − limp→0 V˜ (p) >
V˜ (p∗) and therefore p∗V
′(p∗+) ≥ V (p∗).
61
(e) In this case we follow a similar argument as in cases (b,d,f) and define
V˜ (p) =

V (p) if p ≥ p∗,V+(p; p∗, VS(p∗)) if p < p∗.
By the Crossing Lemma (3), we have V ′L(p∗) = V
′
+(p; p∗, VS(p∗)) so that V˜ (p) is
convex on [0, p∗) and as in cases (b,d,f), limp→0 V˜ (p) = −c/λ < 0. This implies that
p∗V˜
′(p∗) ≥ V˜ (p∗) and therefore p∗V
′(p∗+) ≥ V (p∗).
Existence in case (e). Suppose p∗ ∈ [ξ1, πSR). Let V[p∗,p∗)(p) be the value function of
the best response if W = [p∗, p
∗) (stated in part (e)). Clearly, if W = (p∗, p
∗) the sender
cannot achieve V[p∗,p∗)(p) for p < πLR, since this would require using VLS(p), but the
sender cannot switch to the stationary strategy at p∗ if the receiver stops at p∗. However,
the sender can achieve a value arbitrarily close to V[p∗,p∗)(p) by using the strategy

R-drifting with jump to 0 if p ∈ (p∗, p∗ + ε),
stationary if p = p∗ + ε,
L-drifting with jump to p∗ if p ∈ (p∗ + ε, πLR),
R-drifting with jump to 0 if p ∈ [πLR, p
∗).
For fixed ε > 0 this yields the value function
Vε(p) =


V+(p; p
∗ + ε, VS(p
∗ + ε)) if p ∈ (p∗, p∗ + ε),
VS(p
∗ + ε) if p = p∗ + ε,
V−(p; p
∗ + ε, VS(p
∗ + ε)) if p ∈ (p∗ + ε, πLR),
VR(p) if p ∈ [πLR, p
∗).
Since the ODE (20) is Lipschitz continuous, limε→0 V−(p; p
∗ + ε, VS(p
∗ + ε)) = VLS(p) for
all p ∈ (p∗, πLR). Hence, limε→0 Vε(p) = V[p∗,p∗)(p) for all p ∈ W . Since for p < πLR, the
limit value cannot be achieved by any strategy if W = (p∗, p
∗), the sender has no best
response.
C.17 Proof of Lemma 16
Proof of Lemma 16. Let V (p) denote the value function associated with the sender’s best
response. For p < p∗ we have V (p) = 0 since the receiver stops immediately and for
p ∈ W , V (p) is as characterized in Lemma 15.
For p < p∗, our refinement requires that the sender chooses the experiment that yields
the highest flow payoff if this flow payoff is positive (see Appendix (A.1)). The flow payoff
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is given by
−c + max
0≤q2≤p≤q1≤p∗, α∈[0,1]
λp(1− p)
[
α
V (q1)− V (p)
q1 − p
+ (1− α)
V (q2)− V (p)
p− q2
]
.
Since V (x) = 0 for all x < p∗ and V (q1) > 0 for q1 > p∗, we must have α = 1. The
optimal value for q1 maximizes
q1 − V (p)
q1 − p
.
Since V (p) is convex for p ∈ [p∗, p
∗] by Lemma 15.e, we must have q1 ∈ {p∗, p
∗}.
Consider first the case that p∗ ≤ πℓR. In this case, Lemma 15 implies V (p∗) = 0.
Therefore the optimal jump-target is q1 = p
∗. By (33), the flow payoff from the L-drifting
experiment with jump-target p∗ is negative for p < πℓL. This proves part (b) and part
(a) for the case p∗ ≤ πℓR.
Next consider the case that p∗ > πℓR. In this case, Lemma 15 implies V (p∗) > 0.
Therefore, the optimal jump-target is q1 = p∗ if
V (p∗)
p∗ − p
>
v
p∗ − p
⇐⇒ p > π0,
and q1 = p
∗ otherwise, with indifference at p = π0. Hence q1 = p
∗ if and only if p ≥ π0.
Convexity of V (p) on [p∗, p
∗], together with convexity of VRS(p; qR), implies that πℓR < π0
and Lemma 17 implies πℓL < πℓR < π0. Hence for p < πℓL the optimal target is q2 = p
∗
which yields a negative flow payoff (by (33)) so that passing is optimal.
For p ∈ [πℓL, π0) the optimal target is q2 = p
∗, which yields a positive flow payoff (also
by (33)). For p ∈ [π0, p∗] the optimal target is q2 = p∗. Here, the flow payoff is positive
since it is greater than the flow payoff if the target is q2 = p
∗, and the latter leads to a
positive flow payoff (again by (33)). This shows part (c) and part (a) for p∗ > πℓR.
Finally, for part (d), note that the flow payoff fails upper semi-continuity in q2 at
q2 = p∗. Hence there exists no best response in p ∈ (π0, p∗). For p < πℓL, the argument in
(c) remains valid which proves the statement of part (a) under the assumptions of part
(d).
C.18 Proof of Lemma 17
Proof of Lemma 17. Since πℓR is the lowest value of p such that VRS(p; qR) ≥ 0,
47 it
suffices to show that VRS(πℓL; qR) < 0. From (31) we have
c =
λπℓL(1− πℓL)
p∗ − πℓL
v. (39)
47See Section B.1.5 for the definition of VRS(p; qR).
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Similarly, for φℓL < φ, it suffices to show that Uℓ(φℓL) > URS(φℓL; qR). Rearranging (34)
we have.
c =
λφℓL(1− φℓL)
p∗ − φℓL
(Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗)). (40)
Recall that
VRS(p; qR) =
p
qR
VS(qR)−
(
p log
(
qR
1− qR
1− p
p
)
+ 1−
p
qR
)
c
λ
=
p
p∗
v −
(
2p(p∗ − qR)
p∗qR(1− qR)
+ p log
(
qR
1− qR
1− p
p
)
+ 1−
p
qR
)
c
λ
,
and
URS(p; qR) =
p
p∗
Ur(p
∗)+
p∗ − p
p∗
uLℓ −
(
2p(p∗ − qR)
p∗qR(1− qR)
+ p log
(
qR
1− qR
1− p
p
)
+ 1−
p
qR
)
c
λ
.
Rearranging the terms, and using (39) and (40), we get that both VR(πℓL; qR) < 0 and
Uℓ(φℓL) > URS(φℓL; qR) reduce to the following inequality:
2p(p∗ − qR)
p∗qR(1− qR)
+ p log
(
qR
1− qR
1− p
p
)
+ 1−
p
qR
>
p∗ − p
p∗(1− p)
.
First, consider the case where qR = p
∗ (i.e., p∗ ≤ η). In this case, the necessary
inequality simplifies to
p log
(
p∗
1− p∗
1− p
p
)
+ 1−
p
p∗
>
p∗ − p
p∗(1− p)
⇔ log
(
p∗
1− p∗
1− p
p
)
>
p∗ − p
p∗(1− p)
.
This holds for any p ∈ (0, p∗), because the two sides are identical if p = p∗, and
d
dp
(
log
(
p∗
1− p∗
1− p
p
)
−
p∗ − p
p∗(1− p)
)
= −
1
(1− p)2
(
1− p
p
−
1− p∗
p∗
)
< 0.
Now consider the case where qR = ξ1 (i.e., p
∗ > η). For this case, we show that the
following function is always positive:
f(p) =
2p(p∗ − ξ1)
p∗ξ1(1− ξ1)
+ p log
(
ξ1
1− ξ1
1− p
p
)
+ 1−
p
ξ1
−
p∗ − p
p∗(1− p)
.
It is straightforward that f(0) = 0 and f(ξ1) = (p
∗ − ξ1)/(p
∗(1− ξ1)) > 0. We obtain the
desired result by showing that f is strictly concave over [0, ξ1]. To that end, observe that
f ′(p) =
2(p∗ − ξ1)
p∗ξ1(1− ξ1)
+ log
(
ξ1
1− ξ1
1− p
p
)
−
1
1− p
−
1
ξ1
+
1− p∗
p∗(1− p)2
,
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and thus
f ′′(p) = −
1
p(1− p)2
+
2(1− p∗)
p∗(1− p)3
= −
1
(1− p)3
(
1− p
p
−
2(1− p∗)
p∗
)
.
For any p ∈ (0, ξ1], f
′′(p) < 0, because
1− p
p
≥
1− ξ1
ξ1
=
4− 3p∗ +
√
p∗(9p∗ − 8)
3p∗ −
√
p∗(9p∗ − 8)
>
2(1− p∗)
p∗
whenever p∗ > η.
C.19 Proof of Lemma 18
Proof of Lemma 18. Since φℓL is the lowest value of p such that (cf. (35))
p(1− p)
p∗ − p
λ (Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗)) ≥ c,
it suffices to show that
π0(1− π0)
p∗ − π0
λ (Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗)) < c. (41)
We show that (41) holds if c is sufficiently small and Condition C2 holds.
Step 1: φℓR as a function of c, and limc→0 φℓR = 0.
Adopting the notation introduced in in Section B.1.5, the receiver’s value function
associated with R-drifting experiment below qR can be written as
URS(p; qR) =
p
p∗
Ur(p
∗) +
(
1−
p
p∗
)
uLℓ − CRS(p; qR)
where
CRS(p; qR) = CR(p; qR)+
p
qR
CS(qR) =
(
p log
(
qR
1− qR
1− p
p
)
+ 1−
p
qR
+
p
qR
2(p∗ − qR)
p∗(1− qR)
)
c
λ
.
Recall that φℓR is defined to be the value such that
Uℓ(φℓR) = URS(φℓR; qR)⇔ CRS(φℓR; qR) =
φℓR
p∗
(Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗)). (42)
As c tends to 0, CRS(p; qR) approaches 0 for any p > 0. Therefore, the right-hand side of
this equation must also converge to 0, which implies that φℓR converges 0.
Step 2: π0 as a function of φℓR, and limc→0 π0 = 0.
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Recall that π0 is defined to be the value such that
VRS(φℓR; qR)
φℓR − π0
=
v
p∗ − π0
⇔ π0 =
φℓRv − p
∗VRS(φℓR; qR)
v − VRS(φℓR; qR)
,
where
VRS(φℓR; qR) =
φℓR
p∗
v − CRS(φℓR; qR).
Replacing CRS(φℓR; qR) with equation (42), we get
VRS(φℓR; qR) =
φℓR
p∗
v −
φℓR
p∗
(Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗)).
Plugging this into the equation for π0, we obtain
π0 =
p∗φℓR(Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗))
(p∗ − φℓR)v + φℓR(Ur(p∗)− Uℓ(p∗))
. (43)
Since limc→0 φℓR = 0, we also have limc→0 π0 = 0.
Step 3: deriving an equivalent inequality to (41).
Since limc→0 π0 = 0, inequality (41) holds with equality in the limit as c tends to 0.
We show that it holds with strictly inequality when c is sufficiently small (but strictly
positive) by showing that the derivative of the left-hand side at 0 is strictly less than 1
(which is the derivative of the right-hand side), that is,
lim
c→0
d
dc
(
π0(1− π0)
p∗ − π0
λ (Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗))
)
< 1.
Notice that φℓR is a function of c (via equation (42)), and π0 can be expressed as a function
of φℓR (via equation (43)). Therefore, the above inequality is equivalent to
lim
c→0
d
dπ0
(
π0(1− π0)
p∗ − π0
λ (Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗))
)
dπ0
dφℓR
dφℓR
dc
< 1.
Since limc→0 π0 = 0 and
d
dπ0
(
π0(1− π0)
p∗ − π0
λ (Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗))
)
=
p∗ − 2p∗π0 + π
2
0
(p∗ − π0)2
λ (Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗)) ,
we have
lim
c→0
d
dπ0
(
π0(1− π0)
p∗ − π0
λ (Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗))
)
=
λ (Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗))
p∗
.
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Therefore, the following condition is sufficient for (41) to hold for c sufficiently small:
lim
c→0
dπ0
dφℓR
dφℓR
dc
<
p∗
λ (Ur(p∗)− Uℓ(p∗))
. (44)
Step 4: Proving (44).
We complete the proof by showing that
lim
c→0
dπ0
dφℓR
=
Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗)
v
and lim
c→0
dφℓR
dc
=
p∗
λ (Ur(p∗)− Uℓ(p∗))
.
Since Condition C2 ensures that limc→0 dπ0/dφℓR < 1, these are (exactly) sufficient for
the desired inequality.
From equation (43), we get
dπ0
dφℓR
=
p∗v
((p∗ − φℓR)v + φℓR(Ur(p∗)− Uℓ(p∗)))2
p∗(Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗)).
Combining this with limc→0 φℓR = 0 (from Step 1) immediately yields
lim
c→0
dπ0
dφℓR
=
Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗)
v
.
For limc→0 dφℓR/dc, define
F (φℓR, c) :=
φℓR
p∗
(Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗))− CRS(φℓR; qR)
=
φℓR
p∗
(Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗))−
(
φℓR log
(
qR
1− qR
1− φℓR
φℓR
)
+ 1−
φℓR
qR
+
φℓR
qR
2(p∗ − qR)
p∗(1− qR)
)
c
λ
.
Note that φℓR is implicitly defined by F (φℓR, c) = 0. We have
∂F
∂c
= −
(
φℓR log
(
qR
1− qR
1− φℓR
φℓR
)
+ 1−
φℓR
qR
+
φℓR
qR
2(p∗ − qR)
p∗(1− qR)
)
1
λ
,
= −
CRS(φℓR; qR)
c
= −
1
c
(
φℓR
p∗
(Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗))− F (φℓR, c)
)
,
= −
1
c
φℓR
p∗
(Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗)),
where we have used (42) in the second line. Next, we have
∂F
∂φℓR
=
Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗)
p∗
−
(
log
(
qR
1− qR
1− φℓR
φℓR
)
−
1
1− φℓR
−
1
qR
+
2(p∗ − q)
p∗qR(1− qR)
)
c
λ
=
Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗)
p∗
−
1
φℓR
CRS(φℓR; qR) +
1
φℓR(1− φℓR)
c
λ
=
1
φℓR(1− φℓR)
c
λ
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where we have used (42) to obtain the third line. Therefore, by the implicit function
theorem we have48
dφℓR
dc
=
φ2ℓR(1− φℓR)
p∗c2
λ(Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗)).
Recall that it suffices to show that
lim
c→0
dφℓR
dc
=
p∗
λ (Ur(p∗)− Uℓ(p∗))
.
To obtain this result, notice that the differential equation for φℓR(c) can be expressed as
follows:
dφℓR
dc
1
φ2ℓR(1− φℓR)
= −
d
dc
(
1
φℓR
+ log
(
1− φℓR
φℓR
))
= K
1
c2
= −K
(
1
c
)′
.
where K := λ(Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗))/p∗. Therefore, we have
1
φℓR(c)
+ log
(
1− φℓR(c)
φℓR(c)
)
=
K
c
+ χ, (45)
where χ is the constant of integration. Multiplying both sides by φℓR(c) and letting c
tend to 0, we have
1 + lim
c→0
φℓR(c) log
(
1− φℓR(c)
φℓR(c)
)
= K lim
c→0
φℓR(c)
c
+ lim
c→0
φℓR(c)χ.
Using that limc→0 φℓR(c) = 0 (by Step 1) and limx→0 x log x = 0, it follows that limc→0 φℓR(c)/c =
1/K. Applying these results to the original differential equation, we conclude that
lim
c→0
φ′ℓR(c) = K
(
lim
c→0
φℓR(c)
c
)2
(1− lim
c→0
φℓR(c)) = K
1
K2
=
1
K
=
p∗
λ(Ur(p∗)− Uℓ(p∗))
.
C.20 Proof of Lemma 19
Proof of Lemma 19. We first show that in any SMPE, p∗ ≥ max{φℓL, πℓL}. To this
end, we consider the following “hypothetical” environment in which the sender is less
constrained than in our model: she may choose two experiments, one generating upward
jumps to q1(> p) and the other generating downward jumps to q2(< p). However, the
sender is not constrained to split her attention between the two experiments. Instead,
she can devote “full attention” to both. Specifically, she now has access to information
structures in which α1 = α2 = 1, q1 < p < q2, and αi = 0 for i > 2. Assuming that the
48Note that we cannot apply the implicit function theorem to determine dφℓR(0)/dc since F (φℓR, c) is
not continuously differentiable at (φℓR, c) = (0, 0).
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receiver still takes action r whenever p ≥ p∗, the sender’s flow value of experimentation
is given by
v˜(p) = λp(1− p) max
0≤q2<p<q1≤1
[
V (q1)− V (p)
q1 − p
+
V (q2)− V (p)
p− q2
]
.
Now consider the specific strategy that the sender always targets q2 = 0 and q1 =
p∗. Under the strategy, the sender’s value function, denoted by VFA(p) (FA for “full
attention”), satisfies the following equation whenever she continues to experiment:
c = p˜ = λp(1− p)
(
v − VFA(p)
p∗ − p
−
VFA(p)
p
)
⇔ VFA(p) =
p
p∗
v − CFA(p),
where
CFA(p) =
p∗ − p
p∗(1− p)
c
λ
.
Notice that
V ′FA(p) =
v
p∗
+
1
(1− p)2
1− p∗
p∗
c
λ
> 0 and V ′′FA(p) =
2
(1− p)3
1− p∗
p∗
c
λ
> 0.
Therefore, if we set VFA(p) = 0 whenever the value VFA(p) derived above is negative, then
the function VFA(p) is convex on [0, p
∗].
For the same reason as in Section 5.1, the optimal q1 maximizes the slope V (q1) −
V (p))/(q1−p), while the optimal q2 minimizes the slope (V (p)−V (q2))/(p−q2). Convexity
of VFA(p) over [0, p
∗] implies that if V (p) = VFA(p) then q1 = p
∗ and q2 = 0 are optimal
for the sender. Conversely, since VFA(p) is the value function that arises with the optimal
jump targets q1 = p
∗ and q2 = 0, it must be indeed the optimal value function. Finally,
since VFA(p) is the value function for a problem in which the sender is less constrained,
it forms an upper bound of the sender’s value function in the original problem (given the
waiting region [p∗, p
∗]).
The corresponding value function of the receiver can be derived in a similar fashion:
UFA(p) =
p∗ − p
p∗
uLℓ +
p
p∗
Ur(p
∗)− CFA(p).
Specifically, this can be interpreted as the solution to the problem in which the receiver
chooses two jump targets in [0, p∗] and can devote full attention to each target.
In order to conclude that p∗ ≥ max{φℓL, πℓL}, first observe that VFA(πℓL) = 0 and
UFA(φℓL) = Uℓ(φℓL), which can be directly shown by plugging the values of πℓL and φℓL
in Section B.2 into each function. Combining this with the fact that V (p) ≤ VFA(p) and
U(p) ≤ UFA(p) for all p ≤ p
∗, but V (πℓL) = VFA(πℓL) and U(φℓL) ≤ UFA(φℓL) leads to
the desired result.
For the second result, suppose by contradiction that p∗ > max{φℓL, πℓL} and V (p∗) =
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0. If p∗ > πℓL, then for all p ∈ (πℓL, p∗), the sender uses the L-drifting experiment with
jumps to p∗. This follows from the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 16.(b). The
receiver’s strategy in the candidate equilibrium prescribes to stop for p < p∗. However,
this is not a best response for p ∈ (φℓL, p∗), which is a non-empty interval if φℓL < p∗.
Therefore we must have V (p∗) > 0 if p∗ > max{φℓL, πℓL}.
Now suppose by contradiction that U(p∗) > Uℓ(p
∗). We show that this implies that
there exists ε > 0, such that it is optimal for the receiver to wait if p ∈ [p∗ − ε, p∗),
contradicting the conjectured equilibrium. If V (p∗) > 0, the same argument as in the
proof of Lemma 16.(c) implies that the optimal experiment for the sender is “L-drifting
with jumps to p∗” for p ∈ [π0, p∗). The (flow) benefit of this experiment for the receiver is
λp(1− p)
p∗ − p
(U(p∗)− Uℓ(p))− λp(1− p)U
′
ℓ(p) =
λp(1− p)
p∗ − p
(U(p∗)− Uℓ(p∗)) .
If U(p∗) > Uℓ(p∗), this exceeds the cost c for p sufficiently close to p∗. Hence, the receiver
is willing to stop for all p < p∗ only if U(p∗) = Uℓ(p∗).
C.21 Proof of Lemma 20
Proof of Lemma 20. Note first that both φℓL and πℓL approach 0 as c tends to 0. More-
over, both US(p) and URS(p; qR) (whether qR = p
∗ or qR = ξ1) converge to pUr(p
∗)/p∗ +
(p∗ − p)uLℓ /p
∗. Therefore, the characterization of p∗ from Lemma 19 implies that p∗ → 0
as c→ 0 since either p∗ is given by the indifference condition for the receiver which implies
p∗ = φℓR → 0, or p∗ = max{φℓL, πℓL} → 0. Hence, p∗ < ξ1 if c is sufficiently low. We
therefore assume that c is small enough so that p∗ < ξ1.
Suppose p∗ ≤ η. If p∗ = max {φℓL, πℓL}, Lemma 8 and Condition C2 imply that
p∗ = φℓL. Lemma 18 shows that there exits c(p
∗) > 0 such that for c < c(p∗), π0 < φℓL.
Note that convexity of VR(p) implies that VR(p) > 0 for p > π0. But this implies that
p∗ = φℓL cannot be the lower bound in an equilibrium. If it was, the sender would prefer
to use R-drifting for p close to φℓL which yields VR(φℓL) > 0 = V−(φℓL;φℓL, 0). By Lemma
17, φℓL < φℓR which implies that UR(p) < Uℓ(p) for p ∈ (φℓL, φℓR). Therefore, it is not a
best response for the receiver to wait for p close to φℓL. This contradicts the fact that the
lower bound of the waiting region is p∗ = φℓL.
The proof for the case p∗ > η is similar. The only necessary modification is that
we have to show that VRS(p) > 0 for p > π0, which again follows from convexity of the
sender’s value function.
C.22 Proof of Lemma 21
Proof of Lemma 21. Suppose by contradiction that p∗ > πℓL. Then, by Lemma 19,
U(p∗) = Uℓ(p∗) and V (p∗) > 0. According to Lemma 15, V (p∗) > 0 arises only when the
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sender does not play L-drifting at p∗, and the game ends only when p reaches 0 or p
∗.
This implies that the players’ expected values at p∗ can be written as
V (p∗) =
p∗
p∗
v − C(p∗) and U(p∗) =
p∗
p∗
Ur(p
∗) +
p∗ − p∗
p∗
uLℓ − C(p∗),
where C(p) represents the total cost of delay common for both players. By straightforward
algebra,
U(p∗)− Uℓ(p∗) =
p∗
p∗
(Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗))− C(p∗).
If U(p∗) = Uℓ(p∗) and V (p∗) > 0, but Condition C2 fails, then we arrive at the following
contradiction:
C(p∗) <
p∗
p∗
v ≤
p∗
p∗
(Ur(p
∗)− Uℓ(p
∗)) = C(p∗).
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